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RIGHT OF PUBLICITY:
SURVIVABILITY RECONSIDERED
ANDREW B. SIMS*
INTRODUCTION
N the nearly three decades that have passed since the Second
Circuit's landmark decision in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc.,' the right of a celebrity to control and profit
from the use of his name and likeness, 2 commonly referred to as his
"right of publicity," 3 has been widely recognized by the courts as an
intangible property right that may be the subject of an assignment in
gross.4 On the other hand, the issue whether the right of publicity
may survive the death of the celebrity so as to be assertable by his
heirs or assignees continues to cause dissension.' Presently, the
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. B.A. 1970.
Amherst College; J.D. 1973, Harvard University; Law Clerk, Hon. Charles D.
Breitel, Ch. Judge, New York Court of Appeals, Albany, N.Y., 1973-75.
1. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 1953).
2. Throughout this Article, the pronouns "he," "his" and "him" will also mean
"she" or "her" unless the context suggests otherwise.
3. The right of publicity was apparently first denominated as such by the
Second Circuit in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d
866, 868 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). The term was also referred to
earlier in Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 196, 50 S.E. 68, 70
(1905).
4. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575-
78 (1977); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221 t2d Cir. 1978,
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205, 1206 (8th
Cir. 1969); Ettore v. Philco T.V. Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 487, 489-92 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956); Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing
Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953), Uhlacn-
der v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1280-83 (D. Minn. 1970).
5. Compare Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F. 2d 215, 220-22 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979) and Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F.
Supp. 836, 844-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) with Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc.,
Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 358 (1980) and Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979). See
generally Donenfeld, Property or Other Rights in the Names, Likenesses or Personal-
ities of Deceased Persons, 16 Bull. Copyright Soc'y 17 (1968); Felcher & Rubin,
Privacy, Publicity and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 Yale L.J. 1577,
1593-95, 1618-20 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Felcher & Rubin I]; Felcher & Rubin,
The Descendibility of the Right of Publicity: Is There Commercial Life After Death?,
89 Yale L.J. 1125 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Felcher & Rubiu II], Gordon, Right of
Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 Nw. U.L. Rev. 553, 598-99,
612-13 (1960); Pilpel, The Right of Publicity, 27 Bull. Copyright Soc'y 249 (1980).
Sobel, Count Dracula and the light of Publicity, 47 L.A.B. Bull. 373, 375-76
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courts are split on the issue. Two major rulings this past year have
rejected the survivability 6 of publicity rights. In Lugosi v. Universal
Pictures,' the California Supreme Court denied the heirs of the late
movie actor Bela Lugosi, who had played the title role in the 1930
film "Dracula," an injunction against and an accounting for profits
from the motion picture corporation that had licensed the use of the
image of Lugosi as Dracula on a variety of commercial products.8 In
Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc.,9 the Sixth
(1972); Note, The Right of Publicity-Protection for Public Figures and Celebrities,
42 Brooklyn L. Rev. 527, 541-49 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Protection for Public
Figures]; Note, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures: Descent of the Right of Publicity, 29
Hastings L.J. 751, 767-68 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Descent of the Right of
Publicity]; Comment, Transfer of the Right of Publicity: Dracula's Progeny and
Privacy's Stepchild, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1103, 1124-28 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Dracula's Progeny]; Note, Why Not a Relational Right of Privacy-Or Right of
Property?, 42 U. Mo.-Kan. City L. Rev. 175, 183-85 (1973); 14 Ga. L. Rev. 831,
839-42 (1980); 33 Vand. L. Rev. 1251, 1260-64 (1980).
6. As used in this Article, the term "survivability" and the description of rights
as "survivable" refers generally to the legal enforceability of rights after the death of
the individual in whom the rights were initially vested. Publicity rights described as
"survivable" without qualification would not pass into the public domain upon the
initial right-holder's death, but would be enforceable against the world-at-large by
those who could show that they had legally succeeded to the publicity rights of tile
deceased. Such successors might include (1) assignees or licensees under contracts
into which the deceased right-holder had entered while alive and that by their terms
or under applicable law did not terminate upon his death; (2) heirs of the deceased
right-holder or the executors or administrators of his estate as determined by tes-
tamentary designation or by the laws of intestate succession; and (3) assignees or
licensees of said heirs, executors, or administrators. Thus employed, the term "sur-
vivable" encompasses a number of adjectives with narrower connotations, such as
"devisable" or "bequeathable" (transferable by testamentary bequest) and "descendi-
ble" or "inheritable" (transferable, and receivable, either by testamentary bequest or
under the laws of intestate succession). These more specific adjectives will be used
when appropriate. The issue whether rights of privacy or publicity survive the right-
holder's death so as to be assertable by beneficiaries, executors, or assignees against
post-mortem infringers should be distinguished from the issue whether a cause of
action for infringement of such rights during the complainant's life will lapse if he
dies before the suit is commenced, the trial completed, or a judgment entered. The
former common law rule that causes of action for personal torts do not survive the
death of either the plaintiff or the defendant is now viewed as anomalous and has
been altered, to one extent or another, by statute in virtually all jurisdictions. 2 S,
Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death § 14 (2d ed. 1975); see, e.g., N.Y. Est., Pow-
ers & Trusts Law § 11-3.2 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1980). See generally W.
Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 1126 (4th ed. 1971). The focus of this Article
is on the survival of the right as opposed to the survival of the cause of action,
although the legislative exclusion of defamation and other invasions of intangible per-
sonal property interests from the survival statutes in many jurisdictions may be ger-
mane to both issues.
7. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
8. Id. at 825, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
9. 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 358 (1980).
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Circuit similarly rebuffed attempts of the assignee of the publicity
rights of Elvis Presley to enjoin the sale of Presley statuettes by a
non-profit corporation engaged in a fund-raising effort to build a civic
memorial to the late entertainer.'" Conversely, in Factors Etc., Inc.
v. Pro Arts, Inc.," the Second Circuit held that Presley's right of
publicity was survivable under New York law, inasmuch as Presley
had exercised those rights during his lifetime; the court granted an
injunction against the unauthorized sale of a "memorial" poster bear-
ing Presley's photograph."2
Judicial resolution of the survivability issue has been stymied by
the difficulty in finding instructive analogies in tort and property law
and by the counterbalance of social policy considerations favoring
each side of the question. The problems of judicial policy-making and
line-drawing, 3 coupled with the current division among the courts,"
suggest that legislative intervention, preferably by Congress under its
Commerce Clause powers,' 5 would be salutar." Unfortunately, both
sides to the dispute may lack the political clout to compel action.
This Article is an attempt to aid judicial and legislative considera-
tion of this problem. First, it argues that as a general matter, the
right of publicity, being essentially proprietary in nature, should be
10. Id. at 957.
11. 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
12. Id. at 219-20. The Supreme Court has declined to review the rulings in both
Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 101 S. Ct. 358 (1980) and Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 i2d
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979), letting stand decisions that are irrecon-
cilable as a practical matter. Technically, no conflict exists between the two decisions
because the federal courts ostensibly applied the laws of New York and Tennessee,
respectively. Both courts conceded, however, that little guidance was available from
state decisions. See 616 F.2d at 958; 579 F.2d at 221. Moreover, it is arguable that
general law should apply to right of publicity claims. Felcher & Rubin II, supra note
5, at 1126 n.7; cf. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) (general
law applied to unfair competition claim).
13. E.g., Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc.. Inc.. 616 F.2d 956, 959
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 358 (1980); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures. 25 Cal.
3d 813, 827, 603 P.2d 425, 433, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323. 321 (1979) .Mosk, J., concur-
ring).
14. See notes 5-12 supra and accompanying text.
15. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
16. State legislative intervention is also possible. To date, however, such action
has been sparse and lacking in uniformity. At present, the survivability of publicity
rights, enforceable by surviving relatives, heirs, or assignees through civil actions for
damages and injunctions, is recognized by statute in only four states. Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 540.08 (West 1972); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 839.2 (West Supp. 1980). Utah Code
Ann. § 76-9-406 (1978); Va. Code § 8.01-40 (1977); see notes 48, 65 infra. The recent
court rulings on this subject, however, may kindle state legislative interest in the
problem. The advisability of legislative intervention is discussed in Protection for
Public Figures, supra note 5, at 549.
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survivable. Analogies are drawn to the protection of goodwill and
copyright, while distinctions are made between the non-survivable
right of privacy and the right to be free from defamation. Second, it
considers and rejects making the lifetime exercise of a celebrity's
publicity rights a precondition for survivability. Finally, the Article
examines constitutional and other countervailing considerations and
explores appropriate limitations on the scope and duration of a surviv-
ing right of publicity.
I. ARGUMENTS FAVORING SURVIVABILITY
A. The Property Right
If the word "property" is narrowly defined to connote rights pro-
tecting commercial or pecuniary interests of the individual, 7 most
property rights in our legal system are both assignable and surviv-
able, whereas rights protecting the emotional interests of the indi-
vidual are generally neither. The celebrity's right of publicity is
essentially "proprietary" in nature because of the commercial value
inherent in his ability to control the use of his name and likeness and
to prevent their misappropriation. 9 Obviously, the commercial value
of the celebrity's publicity right can be considerable. In advertising,
the use of a celebrity's name or likeness attracts customers to the
product and influences the purchasing decision not merely by the
force of the endorsement, but also by offering the consumer the
opportunity for emotional association with a public figure."0 Celebri-
ties may be depicted on gameboards, bubble gum cards, posters,
pencils, and other merchandise. They may also be the subjects of
literary, dramatic, and cinematic biographies, as well as of fictional
accounts.
17. See Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866,
868 (2d Cir. 1953). One court has described the term "property" as including "'every
species of estate, real and personal, and everything which one person can own and
transfer to another. It extends to every species of right and interest capable of being
enjoyed as such upon which it is practicable to place a money value."' Yuba River
Power Co. v. Nevada Irrigation Dist., 207 Cal. 521, 523, 279 P. 128, 129 (1929);
accord, Black's Law Dictionary 1095 (5th ed. 1979). In Warren & Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 193 (1890), the authors stated that "the term
.property' has grown to comprise every form of possession-intangible, as well as
tangible."
18. See generally Gordon, supra note 5, at 553-57, 599; Nimmer, The Right of
Publicity, 19 Law & Contemp. Prob. 203, 216 (1954); Warren & Brandeis, supra
note 17, at 205-13; Descent of the Right of Publicity, supra note 5, at 767-68; Protec-
tion for Public Figures, supra note 5, at 530-33, 557.
19. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573,
575-77 (1977); Nimmer, supra note 18, at 204, 215-16; Treece, Commercial Exploita-
tion of Names, Likenesses, and Personal Histories, 51 Tex. L. Rev. 637, 641-52
(1973); Descent of the Right of Publicity, supra note 5, at 767-68; 33 Vand. L. Rev.
1251, 1260-61 (1980).
20. See, e.g., Treece, supra note 19, at 645-46.
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When someone exploits a celebrity's name or image without per-
mission and without a tenable claim to constitutional privilege, the
rightholder is deemed injured,21 the misappropriator unjustly
enriched,2 and an injunction and damages are available.? If the mis-
appropriator competes directly with the celebrity or his assignees and
diverts business from them, the plaintiff's actual damages may be
equated with the diverted profits.24 Otherwise, damages are usually
in the form of reasonable royalties awarded on the quasi-contract
theory that the misappropriator should have obtained a license from
the rightholder.n
B. Analogy to Copyright and Goodwill
The right of publicity is comparable to the protection afforded
goodwill and copyright, intangible property rights that are
21. See generally id. at 641-48.
22. E.g., Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 13S Cal. App. 2d 82, 291
P.2d 194 (1955); McQueen v. Wilson, 117 Ga. App. 488, 161 S.E.2d 63, rer'd on
other grounds, 224 Ga. 420, 162 S.E.2d 313 (1968); Treece, supra note 19, at
648-52.
23. E.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Choppy Prods., Inc., 74
Misc. 2d 1003, 347 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Sup. Ct. 1972); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212
N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938); Treece, supra note 19, at 648-52. But see Memphis
Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S.
Ct. 358 (1980).
24. Diverted profits were apparently sought by the plaintiff in Factors Etc., Inc.
v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090, 1093 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). This remedy is a recov-
ery of "actual" damages on a theory that defendants have tortiously misappropriated
and converted the plaintiffs' property right. See D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of
Remedies § 6.6 (1973). A broader remedy might be an equitable accounting for prof-
its, which would permit the plaintiffs' recovery of all of the profits regardless of the
defendants' contribution of time, money, and effort. Id. § 4.3, at 252-54. In New
York and other jurisdictions, however, an accounting for profits is available only
when a fiduciary relationship is established between the plaintiff and the defendant,
id.; see, e.g., Bradkin v. Leverton, 26 N.Y.2d 192, 199, 2-57 N.E.2d 643, 646, 309
N.Y.S.2d 192, 198 (1970), and therefore wvill likely be denied in right of publicity
cases when the requisite relationship is missing. E.g., Price v. Hal Roach Studios,
Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). An award of punitive or exemplar)
damages will also be unlikely in jurisdictions in which proof of malicious intent is
required for such recovery. Id.; D. Dobbs, supra, § 3.9, at 208-11.
25. Under the quasi-contract action traditionally available "at law." the court im-
plies the existence of a contract between the plaintiff and defendant under which the
former will be paid by the latter for the use of the misappropriated property right.
D. Dobbs, supra note 24, § 4.2, at 238-39. The value of the plaintiff's right of publicity
may be evidenced by previous endorsement fees he has received, see Hogan v. A.S.
Barnes & Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314 (Pa. C.P. 1957), or, if he has not undertaken
such endorsements, by the fees received by others for such personal services. See
Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970). For an excellent
discussion of the benefits and weaknesses of the quasi-contract recovery theory in
right of publicity cases, see Treece, supra note 19, at 648-52.
19811
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survivable,2 although the analogy to either of these rights is imper-
fect. For example, certain dissimilarities between publicity rights and
goodwill should be noted. First, the transfer of goodwill by assign-
ment or bequest can only be made in conjunction with the transfer of
a business or a professional practice because goodwill is inseparable
from the other assets of the enterprise. 27  The right of publicity,
however, can be transferred free of any specific business or product,
and the name and likeness of the celebrity can be readily associated
with new items or enterprises.'
26. In support of the devisability of good will as a general matter, see First
Victoria Nat'l Bank v. United States, 620 F.2d 1096, 1106 (5th Cir. 1980); Guerand
v. Dandelet, 32 Md. 561, 569 (1870); Sessinghaus Milling Co. v. Hanebrink, 247
Mo. 212, 221, 152 S.W. 354, 357 (1912); In re Vivanti, 138 A.D. 281, 282, 122
N.Y.S. 954, 955 (1910). In re Teller, 75 Misc. 592, 594, 136 N.Y.S. 457, 459 (Sur.
Ct. 1912); Bingham School v. Gray, 122 N.C. 699, 701, 30 S.E. 304, 305 (1898);
Roberts Estate, 380 Pa. 600, 606, 112 A.3d 394, 397 (1955); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
§ 14102 (West 1964). Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-810
(1976 & Supp. I 1977), copyrights on works created on or after January 1, 1978
subsist for the life of the author plus 50 years after his death. 17 U.S.C. app. § 302
(1976 & Supp. I 1977)- Under the Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075,
copyrights subsisted for an initial term of 28 years from the publication of the work
and could be renewed one year prior to the expiration of the initial term for an
additional 28 year term either by the author or by specified survivors or executors.
Id. §§ 23-24, 35 Stat. 1080-81. For works created prior to January 1, 1978, the 1976
Act preserves the pre-existing system, except that the 28-year renewal term is ex-
tended to 47 years. 17 U.S.C. app. § 304 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977). Copyrights are
transferable by conveyance or operation of law and "may be bequeathed by will or
pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession." Id. app.
§ 201(d).
27. See, e.g., Metropolitan Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 149 U.S. 436, 446
(1893); Mossier Acceptance Co. v. Martin, 322 F.2d 183, 186-87 (5th Cir. 1963);
Webster Investors, Inc. v. Commissioner, 291 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 1961); Brad-
bury v. Wells, 138 Iowa 673, 680-81, 115 N.W. 880, 883 (1908); 1 R. Callman, The
Law of Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies § 2.2, at 36-37 (3d ed.
1978).
28. If the name of a celebrity is associated with a specific commercial product or
commercial enterprise, it may develop a secondary meaning. As a trademark, it
could be registered and protected under the Lanham Act, §§ 1-45, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1051-1127 (1976), and state statutes. As a tradename, it would be protectible
under state laws of unfair competition. Like goodwill, tradenames and trademarks
can be devised along with the business and products with which they are associated
and to which the efforts of the deceased have added reputation. See, e.g., LePage
Co. v. Russia Cement Co., 51 F. 941, 943 (1st Cir. 1892) (dicta); Southern Scrap
Material Co. v. Smith, 253 Ala. 356, 358, 44 So. 2d 754, 755 (1950); In re Pratt, 117
Pa. 401, 412-13, 11 A. 878, 881 (1888); Dilworth v. Hake, 64 S.W.2d 829, 830 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1933). The same rule should apply to the devisability of "celebrity"
trademarks and tradenames. Cf. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 822-
23, 603 P.2d 425, 430-:31, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 328 (1979) (court declined to decide
whether anyone could build business with secondary meaning, using Lugosi's name).
In rare instances, tradenames and trademarks are deemed non-assignable for fear of
fraud on the public. See Messer v. The Fadettes, 168 Mass. 140, 142, 46 N.E. 407,
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A second difference between goodwill and publicity rights is the
longevity of surviving value. The value of transferred goodwill dimin-
ishes steadily as time passes after the assignment or bequest, while
the new owner or practitioner thereafter establishes his own goodwill
with the public." On the other hand, although the value of a surviv-
ing right of publicity is generally greatest in the days immediately
following the celebrity's death, 3n its value may last for an indefinite
period of time depending on the durability of the celebrity's fame or
on whether a resurgence of popularity and public interest occurs.
Despite these differences, the analogy betveen goodwill and the
right of publicity is a strong one, inhering in the basis underlying the
two concepts. Like the goodwill of a business or a self-employed pro-
fessional, the value of the celebrity's right of publicity lies in his crea-
tion of a positive or otherwise intriguing image in the public mind,
with the concomitant ability to attract the public's patronage, con-
sumption, or support of that with which his name or likeness is
associated. 3' The celebrity usually builds his public image and
fame-as a business creates its goodwill-through the expenditure of
considerable time, money, and effort. a- The analogy to goodwill thus
underscores the extent to which a misappropriator is unjustly en-
riched if he is permitted to exploit the celebrity's fame without
paying for the privilege.n
407 (1897); Russia Cement Co. v. LePage, 147 Mass. 206, 209, 17 N.E. 304, 305
(1888); Hoxie v. Chaney, 143 Mass. 592, 593, 10 N.E. 713. 714-15 (18S7, Blakely v.
Sousa, 197 Pa. 305, 333-34, 47 A. 286, 288 (1900). Thus, unacceptable confusion
might arise if an entertainer were to use the name of another celebrated entertainer.
See, e.g., Messer v. The Fadettes, 168 Mass. 140, 46 N.E. 407 (1897). Presumably,
even this narrow class of cases would not be troublesome if it were widely known
that the celebrated entertainer whose name had been adopted was deceased.
29. See, e.g., Metropolitan Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 149 U.S. 436, 448-49
(1893); cf. R. Calman, supra note 27, at 32 (whether value of acquired goodwill con-
tinues depends on impetus created by purchaser).
30. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279, 285-86 (S.D.N.Y.
1977), aff'd sub nom. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); see Felcher & Rubin II, supra note 5, at
1131.
31. See Treece, supra note 19, at 644-46.
32. See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 220 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876,
880-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D.
Minn. 1970); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 834, 603 P.2d 425, 438,
160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 336 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting); Nimmer, supra note 18, at
216; Treece, supra note 19, at 647; Descent of the Right of Publicity, supra note 5,
at 767; Protection for Public Figures, supra note 5, at 547.
33. E.g., Zacehini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977)
(citing Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?. 31 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 326, 331 (1966)); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215,
220-21 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Lugosi v. Universal Pie-
1981]
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Rights of publicity are also analogous to copyrights, despite the ex-
istence of important conceptual differences. Copyrights protect orig-
inal works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of
expression. 4 Although specific artistic or photographic depictions of
the celebrity's name or likeness may be copyrighted, however, nei-
ther his name or likeness nor his fame in general are copyrightable.Y
Moreover, although celebrities usually attain their fame by being the
subjects or interpreters of copyrighted material, they rarely hold the
copyrights thereon. The star quarterback's touchdown pass may im-
mortalize him, but his team or league probably holds the copyright to
the broadcast. An actress may invest a dramatic role with a unique
and unforgettable interpretation, but the playwright likely holds the
copyright on the play.
Rights of publicity are, nevertheless, analogous to copyrights in two
vital respects. First, protecting the use of the celebrity's name and
likeness serves a public policy of fostering creativity and enterprise in
the celebrity's major field of endeavor by providing additional career
incentive, much the same as the protection of copyrights stimulates
intellectual creativity.36  Under present federal statutes, copyrights
are survivable for at least fifty years beyond the death of the
author.37 Some commentators have reasoned, by analogy, that
survivability of the publicity rights for the financial benefit of heirs
would provide further lifetime career incentive for the celebrity."
Second, the limitation of copyright survival to a finite period after the
author's death is said to reflect the counterweight of free speech and
free trade considerations.39  These countervailing considerations" are
tures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 839, 603 P.2d 425, 441, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 339 (1979) (Bird,
C.J., dissenting); Treece, supra note 19, at 641-52.
34. Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-810 (1976 & Supp.
I 1977), copyright protection is afforded "original works of authorship" including the
categories: "(1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreo-
graphic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and
other audiovisual works; and (7) sound recordings." Id app. § 102(a).
35. See id. app. § 102(a); Felcher & Rubin I, supra note 5, at 1578 n.11.
36. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576-77
(1977); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973); Lugosi v. Universal Pic-
tures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 839-41, 603 P.2d 425, 441-42, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 339-40
(1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting); 1 M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 1.03[A]
(1978). See generally Felcher & Rubin II, supra note 5, at 1129-32; Descent of the
Right of Publicity, supra note 5, at 768. The United States Constitution grants Con-
gress the power to provide for copyrights to "promote the Progress of ... useful
Arts." U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
37. See note 26 supra.
38. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 846, 603 P.2d 425, 446, 160
Cal. Rptr. 323, 344-45 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting); Descent of the Right of Public-
ity, supra note 5, at 768, 773; see Felcher & Rubin II, supra note 5, at 1130-31;
Dracula's Progeny, supra note 5, at 1124-28.
39. See Felcher & Rubin II, supra note 5, at 1129-32.
40. See pt. III infra.
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equally, if not more, relevant to the issue of survivability of publicity
rights and should be reflected in the limitation of survival of publicity
rights to a finite period of even shorter duration."
C. Right of Privacy
Notwithstanding the essentially proprietary nature of the right of
publicity and the analogies drawn to other intangible and survivable
property rights, asserting the right can also occasionally vindicate
emotional interests that should in theory be personal to the celebrity.
Assume, for example, that without permission a manufacturer pro-
duces and sells T-shirts bearing caricatures ridiculing the celebrity.
The T-shirts are thus both unauthorized and pejorative. The celebrity
can successfully assert his right of publicity to obtain damages and an
injunction.2 By obtaining this relief on a theory of commercial mis-
appropriation, the celebrity also has the emotional satisfaction of re-
moving from the market a product that offends and embarrasses him.
Ideally, the celebrity's heirs or assignees should not use the surviv-
ing right of publicity to vindicate their own emotional interests, or
what they perceive to have been the emotional concerns of the de-
ceased celebrity. Even though this distinction is not serious enough
to undermine the general rationale favoring the survivability of pub-
licity rights, it should be weighed in considering the conditions under
which the rights would survive. The courts in Lugosi v. Universal
Pictures" and Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors Etc.,
Inc.,' however, questioned the rationale for the survivability of the
right of publicity itself by drawing analogies to the right of privacy'
and the right to be free from defamation.'6
The right of privacy has been described as the right to be left
alone, to have one's personal feelings undisturbed, and to be free of
emotional upset. 47 Dean Prosser identified four disparate torts sub-
sumed under the common law right of privacy: ' "intrusion upon the
41. See pt. IV infra.
42. See, e.g., Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Choppy Prods., Inc., 74 Misc. 2d
1003, 347 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
43. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr.
323 (1979).
44. Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 358 (1980).
45. 25 Cal. 3d at 819-20, 603 P.2d at 4298-29, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326-27.
46. 616 F.2d at 959-60.
47. See W. Prosser, supra note 6, § 117; Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652A-
6521 (1977).
48. The concept of a "right to privacy," first proposed in an essay by Louis Bran-
deis and Samuel Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890), initially
won recognition as a common law right in Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co.,
122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905). Subsequently, most jurisdictions recognized this
common law right. See generally W. Prosser, supra note 6, § 117, at 802-04. Prosser
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plaintiff's physical solitude or seclusion,"" the public disclosure of
embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff;- ° "publicity which
states that the misappropriation tort was the first type of invasion of privacy recog-
nized by the courts. Id. § 117, at 804. Several states have enacted statutes granting a
cause of action against the unauthorized appropriation for trade or advertising pur-
poses of a person's name or image. Cal. Civil Code § 3344 (West Supp. 1980); Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 540.08 (West 1972); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 214, § 3A (1974); N.Y. Civ.
Rights Law § 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1980); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 839.2
(West Supp. 1980); R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-28 (Supp. 1980); Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-
406 (1978); Va. Code § 8.01-40 (1977); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.50 (West Supp. 1980).
Some of these states and others have statutes making misappropriation a misde-
meanor. Ga. Code Ann. § 106-9904 (1968); N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 50 (McKinney
1976 & Supp. 1980); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 839.1 (West Supp. 1980); Utah Code
Ann. § 76-9-405 (1978); Va. Code § 18.2-216.1 (1977); W. Va. Code Ann. § 47-2-7
(1980). Only a few grant a cause of action to the assignees or surviving relatives of
the deceased for commercial misappropriation of the name or image of the deceased.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 540.08 (West 1972); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 839.2 (West Supp.
1980); Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-406 (1978); Va. Code § 8.01-40 (1977); see note 16
supra; note 65 infra. The Virginia statute specifically limits the action for commercial
misappropriation of the deceased's name or image to 20 years after his death. Va.
Code § 8.01-40 (1977). The Florida statute sets a limitation of 40 years. Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 540.08 (West 1972). The right of privacy in the misappropriation sense has
also been recognized by the courts in most jurisdictions. E.g., Memphis Dcv.
Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 957-58 (6th Cir. 1980) (applying
Tenn. law), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 358 (1980); Gilham v. Burlington Northern, Inc.,
514 F.2d 660, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (applying Mont. law); Carson v.
Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 71, 78 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Neff v.
Time, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 858, 861 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316
F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970); Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 291 F. Supp. 242, 245
(E.D. Mo. 1968), aff'd, 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969); Birmingham Broadcasting Co.
v. Bell, 259 Ala. 656, 68 So. 2d 314, 319 (1953); Olan Mills, Inc. v. Dodd, 234 Ark.
495, 496, 353 S.W.2d 22, 23-24 (1962); Korn v. Rennison, 21 Conn. Supp. 400, 401,
156 A.2d 476, 478 (Super. Ct. 1959); Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 56 Del. 67,
68-69, 189 A.2d 773, 774 (1963); Fergerstrom v. Hawaiian Ocean View Estates, 50
Hawaii 374, 377, 441 P.2d 141, 144 (1968); Kelly v. Franco, 72 II1. App. 3d 642, 646,
391 N.E.2d 54, 57-58 (1979); Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. 643, 648, 86
N.E.2d 306, 308-09 (1949); Johnson v. Boeing Airplane Co., 175 Kan. 275, 278, 262
P.2d 808, 812-13 (1953); Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 432, 120 S.W.
364, 366 (1909), aff'd, 137 Ky. 834, 127 S.W. 476 (1910); Jaubert v. Crowley Post-
Signal, Inc., 375 So. 2d 1386, 1388 (La. 1979); Nelson v. Maine Times, 373 A.2d
1221, 1223-24 (Me. 1977); Beane v. McMullen, 265 Md. 585, 590, 291 A.2d 37, 45
(1972); Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 77-79, 232 A.2d
458, 461-62 (Super. Ct, Ch. Div. 1967); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C.
780, 790, 195 S.E. 55, 64 (1938); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47
Ohio St. 2d 224, 227, 351 N.E.2d 454, 458 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 433 U.S.
562 (1977); Montgomery-Ward v. Shope, 286 N.W.2d 806, 808 & n.1. (S.D. 1979);
Kimbrough v. Coca-Cola/U.S.A., 521 S.W.2d 719, 722 (Tex. 1975); Hirsch v. S.C.
Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 381-82, 280 N.W.2d 129, 132-33 (1979). Con-
tra, Carson v. National Bank of Commerce Trust & Savings, 501 F.2d 1082, 1084-85
(8th Cir. 1974) (applying Neb. law).
49. W. Prosser, supra note 6, § 117 at 807; accord, Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 652B (1977).
50. W. Prosser, supra note 6, § 117, at 809-12; Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 652D (1977).
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places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye";" and "appro-
priation, for the defendant's benefit or advantages, of the plaintiff's
name or likeness." 2  From the standpoint of a "non-public" figure,
all of these privacy torts threaten emotional harm to the individual's
personal feelings. Accordingly, Prosser classified the four privacy torts
as "'personal," and the rights thereby vindicated have been gener-
ally deemed non-assignable s- and non-survivable.
Prosser's first three privacy torts appear to vindicate only emotional
interests. These torts, however, may arise in contexts in which it is
difficult to separate the emotional from the commercial interests
vindicated by the assertion of publicity rights. An unauthorized
biography, for example, may purport to be an accurate account of the
life of a celebrity, but may, in fact, be heavily fictionalized to make
the book more interesting. Although the treatment may be
laudatory,- the celebrity has a "right of privacy" action to vindicate
51. W. Prosser, supra note 6, § 117 at 812; Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 652E (1977).
52. W. Prosser, supra note 6, § 117, at 804-07; Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 652C (1977).
53. W. Prosser, supra note 6, § 117 at 814. Although Prosser himself would
recognize the proprietary nature of the misappropriation tort, id. at 807, his classi-
fication of the latter along with the other three -'privacy" torts as rights "to be let
alone" has led to confusion. See Protection for Public Figures, supra note 5, at 531.
Notably, the Second Restatement of Torts has adopted this classification. Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts §§ 652A, 652C (1977). The Restatement, however, acknowl-
edges that the misappropriation tort "appears rather to confer something analogous to
a property right upon the individual." Id. § 652A, Comment b.
54. See, e.g., Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 78 F.2d 763, 766 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 645 (1935); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d
813, 833 n.8, 603 P.2d 425, 437 n.8, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 335 n.8 (1979) (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1, 6.
294 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129 (Sup. Ct. 1968), aff'd, 32 A.D.2d 892, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948
(1969); Murray v. Cast Lithographic & Engraving Co., 8 Misc. 36, 3S-39, 28 N.Y.S.
271, 272, aff'd, 10 Misc. 365, 31 N.Y.S. 17 (1894); W. Prosser, supra note 6, § 117,
at 815; Nimmer, supra note 18, at 209.
55. E.g., Young v. That Was The Week That Was, 423 F.2d 265. 266 (6th Cir.
1970); Cordell v. Detective Publications, Inc.. 419 F.2d 989, 990 (6th Cir. 1969),
Maritote v. Desilu Prods., Inc., 345 F.2d 418, 420 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 3S2 U.S.
883 (1965); Grusehus v. Curtis Publishing Co., 342 F.2d 775, 776 t10th Cir. 1965),
Justice v. Belo Broadcasting Corp., 472 F. Supp. 145, 147-48 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
Hendrickson v. California Newspapers, Inc., 48 Cal. App. 3d 59. 62, 121 Cal. Rptr.
429, 431 (1975); Bradley v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 26 111. App. 2d 331, 33., 168
N.E.2d 64, 66 (1960); Kelley v. Post Publishing Co., 327 Mass. 275, 276-77, 98
N.E.2d 286, 287 (1951); Moore v. Charles B. Pierce Film Enterprises, Inc., 5S9
S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); W. Prosser, supra note 6, § 117, at 815;
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 6521 (1977). Contra, Smith v. Doss. 251 Ala. 250,
253, 37 So. 2d 118, 121 (1948). Four states have statutes permitting an action for
invasion of privacy by assignees or the surviving spouse and children. See notes 16,
48 supra.
56. E.g., Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543, 274
N.Y.S.2d 877 (1966), vacated, 387 U.S. 239, aff'd, 21 N.Y.2d 124. 233 N.E.2d 840,
286 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1967); notes 174-80 infra and accompanying text.
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his emotional interest in not having his personality publicly displayed
in a false light. Concomitantly, the celebrity has a "right of publicity"
action to vindicate his proprietary interest against any unauthorized
exploitation of his name that is neither statutorily nor constitutionally
privileged. Although the celebrity's commercial interest and his emo-
tional interest are distinguishable in this situation, it is often less
clear whether a court granting judgment for the celebrity has re-
sponded to the privacy claim, the publicity claim, or both.'
Perhaps more troublesome is the confounding of emotional and
commercial interests in Prosser's fourth "privacy" tort-the mis-
appropriation of name and likeness for profit. Because some people
value obscurity, an individual who does not want his name and image
publicly displayed may regard their commercial misappropriation as
an invasion of his "privacy." ' It may cause him embarrassment or
other emotional discomfort in the presence of friends, family, or
strangers who might now recognize him in public. 9 Celebrities, on
the other hand, do not normally seek privacy. Their primary interest
in preventing unauthorized appropriations is not the emotional one of
being left alone, but rather the commercial one of being paid for the
privilege.6w The courts and numerous commentators have recognized
the celebrity's pecuniary motivation and correspondingly a distinct
'right of publicity" as a proprietary right assignable in gross.6 Some
would also conclude that a right of this nature should logically survive
the celebrity's death. 62
57. See, e.g., Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543,
274 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1966), vacated, 387 U.S. 239 (1967), aff'd, 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233
N.E.2d 840, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1968); notes 174-80 infra and accompanying text.
58. See Treece, supra note 19, at 638-41.
59. See, e.g., Eick v. Perk Dog Food, 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952);
Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911); Treece, supra note 19,
at 638-41.
60. Treece, supra note 19, at 641; 33 Vand. L. Rev. 1241, 1252 (1980).
61. See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Ettore v. Philco T.V. Broadcasting Corp.,
229 F.2d 481, 487, 489-92 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956); Haelen
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728-29
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 843-46
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1280-83 (1). Minn. 1970). See gener-
ally Felcher & Rubin I], supra note 5, at 1127-32; Nimmer, supra note 18, at 203-
23; Treece, supra note 19, at 637-54, 671-72.
62. E.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221-22 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Factors Etc.. Inc. v. Creative Card Co.,
444 F. Supp. 279, 282, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400
F. Supp. 836, 844-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813,
848-49, 603 P.2d 425, 447, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 345 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting);
Gordon, supra note 5, at 598-99, 612-13; Felcher & Rubin II, supra note 5, at 1132;
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Nevertheless, Prosser's original classification of commercial misappro-
priation as a privacy tort has undoubtedly retarded the recognition
of a survivable right of publicity." Many jurisdictions have common
law precedents suggesting that the interest against misappropriation
is a personal and non-survivable "privacy" right." Furthermore,
many state statutes grant an action for misappropriation only to living
persons,' which might lead courts to question why the legislature
would so limit the statute if it contemplated a surviving right of
publicity.6 Confronted with such a statute in the Lugosi case,"- the
California Supreme Court concluded that the celebrity's inter vivos
right against misappropriation was not a distinct "right of publicity,"
but merely a special variation of the statutory "privacy" right that was
assignable during Lugosi's life but not survivable thereafter.- The
better approach, taken by the Second Circuit in Haelen Laboratories,
Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,' is to treat the right of publicity
as a common law property right additional to and independent of the
statutory right of privacy.-
Some commentators have argued that the "right of privacy" and
the "right of publicity" are, respectively, merely the negative and
affirmative assertions of the right to be free from unauthorized
appropriations.7 ' It would follow that a plaintiff who was not a
celebrity or a "public person" could assert a right of publicity as well
as a right of privacy. - For example, Ms. Smith is photographed on a
FeIcher & Rubin I, supra note 5, at 1618-20; Pilpel, supra note 5. Descent of the
Right of Publicity, supra note 5, at 754; Comment, Privacy, Appropriation, and the
First Amendment: A Human Cannonball's Rather Rough Landing, 1977 B.Y.U.L.
Rev. 579, 587; Protection for Public Figures, supra note 5, at 545, Dracula's Prog-
eny, supra note 5, at 1124-28.
63. See generally Gordon, supra note 5, at 594-605; Treece, supra note 19, at
638-39 & n.6; Protection for Public Figures, supra note 5, at 530-31, 541.
64. See notes 53-55 supra and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 3344 (West Supp. 1980); Ca. Code Ann. § 106-
9904 (1968); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 214, § 3A (1974); N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 50, 51
(McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1980); R.I. Gen. Law § 9-1-28 (Supp. 1980); W'is. Stat.
Ann. § 895.50 (West Supp. 1980); note 48 supra and accompanying text. The pri-
vacy statutes of four states do permit recovery by surviving relatives or assignees for
misappropriation of the name or image of a deceased person. See notes 16, 48 supra.
66. See, e.g., Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 819-21, 603 P.2d 425,
428-30, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 326-27 (1979); Schumann v. Loew's Inc., 135 N.Y.S.2d
361, 366-68 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
67. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813. 603 P. 2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr.
323 (1979).
68. Id. at 819-21, 603 P.2d at 428-30, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326-27.
69. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
70. Id. at 868.
71. See, e.g., FeIcher & Rubin I, supra note 5, at 1620-21; Pilpel. supra note 5.
at 259.
72. See, e.g., Pilpel, supra note 5, at 255-57.
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public street without her permission, and the picture is used in a
newspaper advertisement. Whether Ms. Smith is emotionally upset
will depend on her personal sensitivities, but she may want to be
paid for the privilege. Most states would recognize, by common law
or statute, a "right of privacy" action for Ms. Smith to recover in
quasi-contract what the defendants saved by not paying her as a
model and to obtain an injunction against future publication of the
advertisement.73 If Ms. Smith uses the injunction to suppress the
advertisement, she is exercising her "right of privacy." If, on the
other hand, she permits the defendants to republish the advertise-
ment on the condition that they pay her for it, she is exercising her
"1right of publicity." If Ms. Smith takes the path of "publicity," but
dies while the advertisement is still running, her heirs should suc-
ceed to her contract rights to continuing residuals. Ms. Smith's in-
terest in the residuals is strictly a commercial one, and therefore, in
theory as well as in fairness, the right should be survivable for the
benefit of her heirs.
Arguments favoring the survivability of a celebrity's publicity right
by the analogies to goodwill and copyright, however, lose some valid-
ity when applied to a non-celebrity's publicity right. Assume, for ex-
ample, that Mr. Jones, an internationally renowned movie and televi-
sion star, is a true "celebrity" in the sense that his name and image
are widely recognized by a public that is familiar with his achieve-
ments. Mr. Jones' career as an actor hinges upon creating a favor-
able image with the public. Professional success helped to create the
image, thereby facilitating further professional triumphs. In addition
to his celluloid career, Mr. Jones derives income from endorsing a
variety of nationally advertised commercial products ranging from
bluejeans to candy bars. As with the creation of goodwill in a busi-
ness or profession, Mr. Jones has thus invested valuable resources of
time, money, and energy in creating a public image that is not only
conducive to professional success, but also commercially valuable.7 4
By comparison, Ms. Smith's opportunity for commercial exploita-
tion of her image may be perceived as largely fortuitous. If Ms.
Smith permits the advertisement to run, the only time, effort, and
expense that she will have contributed towards achieving "publicity"
for her visage would be bringing a lawsuit to establish her commer-
cial interest in the use of the photograph. Beyond that, Ms. Smith's
only "property" at issue is her face itself, an asset that would not
survive Ms. Smith in the public mind but for the defendant's adver-
tisement.
73. See note 48 supra.
74. The creation and value of his image is comparable to the establishment and
value of goodwill in a business or professional practice. See notes 31-33 supra and
accompanying text.
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Applying the copyright analogy, the protection of Mr. Jones' right
of publicity arguably serves as incentive for his commitment to fur-
ther achievements in his acting career. It is Jones' career achievements
in drama, rather than his successes in the realn of commercial adver-
tising, in which society is presumed to have a significant interest and
that society might want to reward. Although the right of publicity
directly protects commercializations of his name and image, little
societal interest exists in having Mr. Jones, as opposed to someone
else, promote bluejeans and candy bars. The protection of Ms.
Smith's right of publicity, however, cannot be presumed to stimulate
increased achievement in a collateral field of endeavor in which there
is significant societal interest. Other than advertising, Ms. Smith never
engaged in enterprises in which the commercial value of her image
would have been relevant. 3
Finally, Mr. Jones and Ms. Smith are not both "public persons" in
the same sense of the term. While Mr. Jones has committed himself,
perhaps irreversibly, to living and succeeding in the limelight, Ms.
Smith still retains the ability to remain a "private person" even if she
permits the use of her photograph in the advertisement. Few stran-
gers will recognize her in public, and only personal acquaintances
will be able to connect her name with the face in the advertisement.
If Ms. Smith feels in retrospect that even this single advertisement
represented too much public exposure, unlike the celebrit' she can
probably regain her "privacy" simply by declining future commer-
cializations.
Therefore, despite the view that the right of publicity and the right
of privacy are affirmative and negative assertions of the same right,
not every private person who exercises his right of publicity thereby
becomes a "public person." Moreover, the arguments favoring the
survival of a private person's publicity rights are not full) comparable
to those favoring the survival of a celebrity's publicity rights. The
rights of publicity of both the celebrity and the non-celebrity, how-
ever, should be survivable because they vindicate interests that are
principally commercial in nature and are distinguishable from the
emotional interest vindicated by the right of privacy.
D. Right to be Free from Defamation
Defamation is an invasion of one's commercial interest in reputa-
tion or good name by derogatory words directed towards a third party
either in writing or orally.76 Like the right of publicity, defamation is
75. Non-celebrities who commercialize their images may be -'discovered- by
agents or producers who give them an opportunity to achieve in other more socially
significant image-oriented fields, such as acting. Society may have a limited interest
in such discoveries, but the possibility of their occurrence is remote, and in any
event, we know that this interest has not been served as of Ms. Smith's death.
76. See generally W. Prosser, supra note 6, § 111, at 73744.
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concerned not with the emotions, but with the pecuniary interests of
the victim."7 It is irrelevant that the victim feels anger, sorrow, or
humiliation as a result of the defamation, or even that he has lost
the company of friends if he cannot show pecuniary loss.71 The com-
mon law, however, does not recognize a cause of action for defama-
tion of the dead. ° Judge Merritt, in his opinion in Memphis
Development,' argued that, similarly, the right of publicity should
not survive because
[t]he two interests that support the inheritability of the right of
publicity, namely, the "effort and creativity" and the "hopes and
expectations" of the decedent, would also support an action for
libel or slander for destruction of name and reputation after death.
Neither of these reasons, however, is sufficient to overcome the
common law policy terminating the action for defamation upon
death. "
Indeed, when placed in the context of a post-mortem action by the
victim's successor, the analogy between actions for defamation of the
dead and surviving rights of publicity poses two distinct problems.
First, because the right of publicity may overlap to some degree with
the right to be free from defamation, a surviving right of publicity
could serve as a practical substitute for the proscribed civil action for
defamation of the dead. If, for example, a biography of a deceased
celebrity is both unauthorized and pejorative, perhaps even defama-
tory, relief8 ' could theoretically be granted to the celebrity's heirs or
assignees for commercial misappropriation of the celebrity's name
even though the plaintiffs were unable to prove that the pejorative
statements were false, were known by the author to have been false,
77. Id. § 111, at 737, 760-61; see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 575 (1977).
78. W. Prosser, supra note 6, § 111, at 737, § 112, at 760-61. Prosser states that
although emotional injury is insufficient to make defamation actionable, if the cause
of action is established by showing "special" pecuniary damages, damages for emo-
tional injuries can be "tacked" on. Id. § 112, at 761; accord, Restatement (Second) or
Torts § 575 (1977).
79. W. Prosser, supra note 6, § 112 at 761; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 575
(1977).
80. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 560 (1977); accord, W. Prosser, supra note
6, § 111, at 745. The Restatement states that "[t]he interest of the descendants or
other relatives of a deceased person in his good name is not given legal protection by
the common law." Restatement, supra, § 560, Comment a, at 158.
81. Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 358 (1980).
82. Id. at 959.
83. See, e.g., Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 433 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 352 (1979).
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or that they diminished the commercial value of the deceased celebri-
ty's fame. From this perspective, it would seem both inconsistent and
inequitable to permit a celebrity's heirs to censure and recover dam-
ages for pejorative speech that may not be defamatory, while the
heirs of non-celebrities are denied a civil action for post-mortem
defamation.
This problem can be obviated by limiting the applicability of the
surviving right of publicity to commercial items only, as the courts
have in fact done.-5 Such a limitation recognizes the strong first
amendment objections to allowing either defamation actions or the
enforcement of publicity rights to obstruct or chill the reporting of
newsworthy information, 6 the writing of factual biography and
history," and even the writing of creative fiction. In the case of a
living celebrity, these constitutional free speech principles limit re-
covery under both defamation or publicity right infringement theories
to those rare instances in which the celebrity can prove not only that
the statements were false, but also that they were made with knowl-
edge of the falsity or with reckless disregard of the truth."' These
constitutional considerations may apply with even greater force in a
right of publicity action after the celebrity's death.-
A second, conceptually broader problem raised by the defamation
analogy stems from the law's refusal to permit the post-mortem %in-
dication of commercial interests in personal reputation." Defamation
84. See notes 80, 91-93 supra and accompanying text.
85. E.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 2'1-22 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp.
426, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 842
(S.D.N.Y. 19755); see Felcher & Rubin II, supra note 5, at 1130; Felcher & Rubin I,
supra note 5, at 1597-99, 1606.
86. See Felcher & Rubin I, supra note 5, at 1596-97, pt. III(B)(l) infra.
87. See Felcher & Rubin I, supra note 5, at 1596-98; pt. Ill(B)(2) infra.
88. See Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 430-33 tS.D.N.Y. 1978);
Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 865-75, 603 P.2d 454, 457-
64, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 355-62 (1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring); Felcher & Rubin I,
supra note 5, at 1598; pt. III(B)(2) infra.
89. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351-52 (1974) (persons who
have "general fame or notoriety in the community" are "public-figures" who may
recover for defamation only upon clear and convincing showing of defendant's knowl-
edge or reckless disregard of defamatory nature of publication); Curtis Publishing Co.
v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153-56 (1967) (football coach charged by national magazine
with fixing game held to be "public figure," subject to same standard); Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 390-97 (1967) (false-light portrayal of individual's personal life, in
violation of state right-of-privacy statute, can be basis of recovery only upon showing
of knowing or reckless falsehood); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
284 (1964) (defamation of public official by newspaper could not be basis for damage
recovery under state libel law absent showing of knowing or reckless falsehood).
90. See pt. III infra.
91. See, e.g., Insull v. New York World-Telegram Corp., 172 F. Supp. 615, 636
(N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 273 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 942 (1960),
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of a dead person may impair the social acceptability and popularity of
close relatives, thereby reducing their own commercial opportunities.
Thus, a civil action for defamation of the dead, like a survivable right
of publicity action, could be perceived as protecting interests of a
proprietary nature. The courts, however, have declined to recognize
such commercial injury to the family of the deceased in civil defama-
tion actions.' For reasons of social policy, personal reputations are
deemed independent of each other and non-transferable as a matter
of law. In 1910, one court described this rule as
a necessary incident to the theory of social relations entertained
here where one is supposed to stand or fall upon his own merits,
and where success or failure is entirely independent of the acci-
dents of rank or family connection. It necessarily follows that,
theoretically, at least, no man's success can be aided or retarded
by the character of his relative.
Because the law's idealistic position does not always comport with
the realities of societal behavior, however, the practical effect of this
rule may be to ignore many bona fide claims for commercial injury by
close family members of the deceased. 4 Regardless of the fairness of
this rationale for denying post-mortem defamation actions, the
rationale for post-mortem right of publicity actions is conceptually
different. Unlike the plaintiff in the typical post-mortem defamation
case, the celebrity's successor who asserts the right of publicity does
not contend that his own personal reputation in the community has
been either enhanced or diminished from a commercial standpoint by
association with the deceased. Indeed, more often than not, an as-
signee whose reputation bears no conceivable relationship to that of the
deceased would hold the surviving right of publicity.5 The succes-
sor's argument is that control over the commercial use of the name
and image of a famous person is an intangible property right with
commercial value that should be inheritable and assignable like other
tangible and intangible property. Notably, the principal rationale for
rejecting claims for defamation of the dead addresses only the social
policy behind the non-transferability of personal reputations, not the
Lee v. Weston, 402 N.E.2d 23, 26-30 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Hughes v. New England
Newspaper Publishing Co., 312 Mass. 178, 179, 43 N.E.2d 657, 658-59 (1942); Rose
v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 284 N.Y. 335, 337-38, 31 N.E.2d 182, 183-84 (1940).
92. See cases cited note 91 supra.
93. Skrocki v. Stahl, 14 Cal. App. 1, 5, 110 P. 957, 959 (1910).
94. See generally 40 Colum. L. Rev. 1267 (1940); 26 Cornell L.Q. 732 (19,11).
95. See, e.g., Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956,
957 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 358 (1980); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts,
Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
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issue of the transferability of property rights in general. Despite its
broad reference to the independence of success or failure from "the
accidents of rank or family connection," the state court writing this in
1910 would not for a moment have questioned the right of the Astor
and Vanderbilt offspring to succeed to the family silver.
Of course, the celebrity's personal reputation is often an indispens-
able component of the fame that makes his name and image commer-
cially valuable. If heirs or assignees succeed to the deceased celeb-
rity's right of publicity, the deceased's reputation continues to have
value in the hands of the transferee to the extent that reputation is an
inextricable part of the right. Arguably, this result does represent a
departure from the rule that neither the benefits nor the burdens of
personal reputation are inheritable. Moreover, when a celebrity's
heirs assert their surviving right of publicity ostensibly to prevent
commercial misappropriation, they can concomitantly vindicate their
emotional interests against the denigration of their decedent's image.
Limiting the surviving right of publicity to commercial products
will largely obviate these conceptual inconsistencies between the sur-
vivability of publicity rights and the common law and statutory rejec-
tion of an action for defamation of the dead. The inconsistencies,
however, cannot be eliminated entirely. If, for example, the right-
holders could suppress unauthorized caricature T-shirts," they would
not only prevent misappropriation, but also protect the commercial
value of the publicity rights by preserving the reputation of their de-
cedent. Less obviously perhaps, the rightholders can achieve the
same purpose if they refuse to permit the name or image of the de-
ceased celebrity to be used in the promotion of products they deem
inferior, inappropriate, or harmful to the celebrity's image.' These
inconsistencies may be relevant in setting appropriate limitations on
survivability. Like the objection to the possible vindication of emo-
tional interests after the celebrity's death," however, they are too
hypothetical and inconsequential to refute entirely the arguments
favoring the survivability of publicity rights in general/
96. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
97. See generally Treece, supra note 19, at 641-43.
98. See notes 42-43 supra and accompanying text.
99. Other "policy reasons" cited for rejecting civil liability for post-mortem def-
amation are also inapposite to the survivability of the rights of publicity. It is argued
that it is impossible to determine what degree of consanguinity is needed for a rela-
tive to justifiably assert pecuniary injury from post-mortem defamation, so that the
defendant is exposed to a limitless number of lawsuits. Saucer v. Giroux, 54 Cal.
App. 732, 733, 202 P. 887, 888 (1921); see Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 2Z5 Cal. 3d
813, 822, 603 P.2d 425, 430, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 328 (1979). In the case of a surviv-
able right of publicity, however, the eligible plaintiffs would be both limited and
identifiable because only specific assignees or beneficiaries could assert title to the
right. Another argument is that the recognition of a relative's post-mortem action for
defamation would require recognizing a similar right in the relatives wlen the
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II. THE LIFETIME EXERCISE REQUIREMENT
A. Career Incentive Theory
Some jurists and commentators would recognize rights of publicity
as survivable only on the condition that the deceased celebrity exer-
cised his publicity rights during his lifetime."°  A variation of this
"lifetime exercise requirement" demands that the celebrity's contract
exercising his publicity right be extant and enforceable at the time of
his death. 0'
The principal rationale advanced for the lifetime exercise require-
ment is the career incentive theory. This theory, as applied to public-
ity rights, has its major analogue in the law of copyrights, in which
the protection of original works fixed in a tangible medium of ex-
pression is presumed to yield benefits to society. Similarly, it is
inferred from the celebrity's exercise of his publicity right that the
right was important to him, and that the contemplation of the surviv-
ability of its benefits for his heirs provided him with additional career
incentive."°  In turn, this incentive may have resulted in additional
celebrity is alive. Bradt v. New Nonpareil Co., 108 Iowa 449, 450, 70 N.W. 122, 123
(1899). The right of publicity, however, would be the celebrity's during his lifetime
unless he assigned it, and in either case, only one party at a time could assert the
right. The final policy reason for rejecting the post-mortem defamation action is that
it would chill the writing of history. Rex v. Topham, 4 T.R. 126, 129, 100 Eng. Rep.
931, 933 (K.B. 1791); see Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d
956, 959-60 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 358 (1980). But see 40 Colum. L.
Rev. 1267, 1269 n.11 (1940). This problem would be obviated by limiting the post-
mortem right to infringing commercial products. See note 85 supra, note 144 infra
and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 823-24, 603 P.2d 425,
431, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 329 (1979); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 140 Cal.
Rptr. 775, 778-79 (1977), aff'd on other grounds, 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160
Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979). Contra, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 1251, 1263 (1980). In the Lugosi
case some ambiguity exists as to whether the decision turns on rejection of the
survivability of publicity rights generally or merely upon Lugosi's failure to exercise
his rights during his lifetime. In Guglielmi, the companion case to Lugosi, however,
the California Supreme Court described its holding in Lugosi as the broader rejec-
tion of survivability. 25 Cal. 3d at 861, 603 P.2d at 455, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 353. In
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221-22 & n.11 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979), the Second Circuit's decision in favor of survivabil-
ity turned specifically upon the fact that Elvis Presley had exercised his rights of
publicity during his lifetime. The court, however, explicitly reserved the question
whether non-exercised rights of publicity would survive. Id. at 222 n.11. See gener-
ally Felcher & Rubin [I, supra note 5, at 1130-31; Felcher & Rubin I, supra note 5,
at 1618-20.
101. See Felcher & Rubin II, supra note 5, at 1130-31; Felcher & Rubin 1, supra
note 5, at 1618-20 & n.188. Felcher and Rubin would apparently limit the post-
mortem protection of publicity rights to unexpired contracts in which the celebrity's
heirs or beneficiaries retain a beneficial interest. See pt. II(B) infra.
102. See notes 34-39 supra and accompanying text.
103. See Felcher & Rubin II, supra note 5, at 1130-31; Felcher & Rubin 1, supra
note 5, at 1618-19.
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career achievements from which society benefited. '" If the celebrity
did not exercise his publicity right, only negative inferences are
drawn, and it is reasoned that recognizing the survivability of the
right cannot serve any social policy. 11
Significant differences between publicity rights and copyrights rel-
evant to their societal impact, however, exist. Copyrights directly
protect the creative intellectual work in which society is presumed to
have an interest. Without the benefit of copyrights, authors might
receive little remuneration for their efforts because their works could
be freely copied once revealed to the public. Although pecuniary re-
muneration is not the only reason why creative people create, with-
out copyrights the increased likelihood of plagiarism and contested
authorship might also eliminate much of the author's personal pride
incentive.
In contrast, the right of publicity does not directly protect a
celebrity's noncopyrightable achievements from which society is pre-
sumed to benefit, such as the inspired dramatic interpretation, the
outstanding athletic performance, or from a broader perspective, the
more prodigious or prolonged career. Rather, the right of publicity
protects the commercialization of fame, merely a collateral benefit of
unusual individual achievement. If the career incentive theory under-
lies the right of publicity, therefore, it must be assumed that the
desire to attain, retain, or augment commercially exploitable fame
provides added career incentive in the principal fields of endeavor
and results in achievements that society would not otherwise obtain.
The hope of becoming famous can, of course, be a career incentive
for many who never attain fame. Nevertheless, not all those who
aspire to or achieve fame perceive it in financial terms. Before it
became financially lucrative for celebrities to endorse commercial
products, the world did not lack people aspiring to notoriety, nor is it
clear that the achievements of that day were less impressive than
those of our own. Furthermore, although most writers, poets, com-
posers, and photographers rely directly on the copyright laws to pro-
tect their primary source of income, relatively few persons attain the
celebrity status to which the right of publicity becomes relevant. The
right of publicity protects a collateral source of income of a small
minority who become prominent, generally in the fields of entertain-
ment and professional sports. For most people in these fields, the
principal sources of income are their salary and employment contract
104. See Felcher & Rubin II, supra note 5, at 1128; Felcher & Rubin 1. Vipra
note 5, at 1615.
105. See Felcher & Rubin II, supra note 5, at 1130-31. Felcher & Rubin I. supra
note 5. at 1619.
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rights for their professional efforts on the stage, screen, and athletic
field. 1%
With respect to lifetime incentive and achievement, the analogy
between copyrights and publicity rights becomes more tenuous if the
focus is on the living celebrity or author contemplating that after his
death his intangible property rights will continue to have value for
the benefit of his heirs. The death of an author, for example, does not
normally impair the commercial or societal value of his intellectual
work. An author may be unable to anticipate the commercial success
of his work during the creative process, and many authors and their
works do not receive public recognition until after the authors'
deaths. Nevertheless, an author can foresee that his death will not
itself diminish the prospect of his work remaining or becoming com-
mercially successful, and the survival of his copyrights may be an
important incentive to achievement. In contrast, many celebrities
who presently enjoy commercially valuable fame might not assume
that a comparable level of public interest in them will continue after
their deaths. Death removes celebrities from the public view and
renders many forms of commercial exploitation unfeasible.10 Usually,
only the most famous continue to attract a commercially exploitable
public interest after death. A celebrity rarely becomes, in this sense,
an "immortal," and the possibility of such "immortality" is usually
quite speculative.
Another difference between the survivability of copyrights and
publicity rights relates to the timing of the achievements they are
presumed to encourage. The authors of intellectual works are often
still productive in the later years of their lives. Indeed, many may
reach the pinnacle of their creativity during this period."° The sur-
106. Of course, many celebrities, such as retired athletes or those in the less
remunerative sports, may actually rely far more on the commercial value of the fame
and publicity generated by their activities, past or present, than on those same activ-
ities.
107. For example, product endorsements by celebrities on television and in print,
which have noticeably increased in the last several years, see Feinberg, Madison
Avenue's Cast of Famous Faces, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1980, § F, at 7, col. 1, would
have little or no value to the advertisers or the royalty-recipients if the celebrity
died. Indeed, such advertisements would most likely be pulled from the media in
the event of the celebiity's death to avoid offending public sensitivities and creating
an adverse consumer impact.
108. Among innumerable examples, one might note Joseph Hayden's oratorios,
"The Creation" and "The Seasons," composed respectively at the age of 66 and 69,
M. Cross, Encyclopedia of the Great Composers and Their Music 362, 371 (2d ed.
1962), Giusseppi Verdi's operas "Otello" and "Falstaff," composed respectively at the
ages of 74 and 80, id. at 821, 827-28, and Richard Wagner's opera "Parsifal," coin-
pleted at the age of 69, id. at 847, 859. In addition, Victor Hugo wrote "Les Miser-
ables" at age 60, Dictionary of French Literature 154-56 (S. Braun, ed. 1958); Henrik
Ibsen wrote "Hedda Gabler" at age 62, 2 V. Hopper, Essentials of World Literature
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vival of copyrights ensures that the prospect of imminent death will
not eliminate the financial incentive for these "late-life'" works. By
comparison, the more significant achievements of celebrities enjoying
commercially valuable publicity rights are likely to be those accom-
plished at a younger age,'" when the possibility of a commercially
exploitable "immortality" may have been given little thought in view
of the more immediately available financial rewards. Even if an enter-
tainer remains professionally productive in his later years, the image
in which post-mortem publicity value inheres has usually been estab-
lished in the prime of his career."" Although late-life professional
work may serve to keep the celebrity in the public view, its effect
upon the value of the surviving right of publicity is often insignifi-
cant, if not adverse. Thus, wvhile the survivability of copyrights is a
direct financial incentive for significant late-life works, a surviving
right of publicity may not serve a comparable social purpose.
A final difference between copyrights and publicity rights inheres
in the legal grounds for contemplating the survivability of the rights.
Copyrights have been a part of the Anglo-American legal system
since 1710."' Significantly, both professional intellectuals and the
public are generally aware of the availability and the survivability of
copyrights, although they may be unfamiliar with the specific statu-
tory terms. Those who aspire to fame probably also assume that they
will be able to control and profit from its commercialization. Yet,
notwithstanding the notoriety of the recent Elvis Presley decisions,"'
585, 610 (1952); and Alfred Lord Tennyson wvrote "Idylls of the King" at age 83, 4
Moulton's Library of Literary Criticism 204-05 (1966).
109. This is almost invariably true in the case of professional athletes, with excep-
tions found in such sports as golf, billiards, and bowling. Although many actors opt
for early retirement, a number, such as Ethel Barrymore, Helen Hayes, Katharine
Hepburn, Henry Fonda, Lawrence Olivier, and James Stewart, have been successful
in prolonged careers. Old age does not seem to impair either the skill or popularity
of leading instrumentalists such as Arthur Rubinstein, Vladimir Horowitz, or Isaac
Stern, or conductors such as Leonard Bernstein, Karl B6hm, or Arturo Toscanini. On
the other hand, few dancers or vocalists can similarly prolong their careers and most
will "peak" at an earlier age.
110. Particularly in the case of movie and television stars, the myvstique memorial-
ized by the public after their deaths is usually that created in the prime of their
careers, which rarely occurs in later life. The immortalized Bela Lugosi "Dracula"
was a characterization created over 25 years before his death. If Mae Vest's image
has surviving value, it will be for her portrayal in "'I'm No Angel" or "'My Little
Chicadee," not for her septuagenarian efforts in *'Myra Breckinridge." Similarly, the
post-mortem publicity rights of Lawrence Olivier will probably stein from his image
in "Hamlet" or in "Wuthering Heights" rather than in "'The Boys from Brazil" or
"The Jazz Singer."
111. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne, c. 19. For a history of Anglo-American copy-
right legislation, see Cohen, Duration, 24 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1180, 1192-97 (1977).
112. Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc.. Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 358 (1980); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215
(2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
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the survivability of publicity rights remains a rather esoteric legal
point on which it is unlikely that most celebrities would receive any
specific advice until after their careers had already reached fairly re-
spectable plateaus. Until recently, the survivability of publicity rights
has been universally rejected by the courts "I and has yet to be recog-
nized in most jurisdictions."' It is thus problematical to hypothesize
that many deceased celebrities were seriously motivated in their
careers by the contemplation of their descendants enjoying the ben-
efits of those rights.
Consequently, when applied to publicity rights, the career incen-
tive theory is far more speculative than in the case of copyrights.
Rather, this theory is properly viewed as only one argument support-
ing the survivability of publicity rights, along with the recognition of
the essentially proprietary nature of the right, analogous to goodwill,
and the unjust enrichment of the misappropriators. Because the life-
time exercise requirement makes the career incentive theory the
lynchpin for survivability, however, this requirement is neither realis-
tic nor fair, particularly with respect to cases now before the courts.
Thoughtful investigation reveals that only the rare fact pattern con-
vincingly demonstrates a relationship between lifetime exploitation
and the career incentive theory. To illustrate, the assignment contract
113. See, e.g., Maritote v. Desilu Prods., Inc., 345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 883 (1965); James v. Screen Gems, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 2d 650, 344
P.2d 799 (1959); Schumann v. Loew's Inc., 135 N.Y.S.2d 361 (Sup. Ct. 1954), cf.
Miller v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 706 (2d Cir.) (proceeds of contract purporting to
sell "right" to make motion picture were ordinary income), cert. denied, 370 U.S.
923 (1962).
114. Professor Gordon endorsed the principle of survivability in 1960 and cited an
earlier, unreported decision implicitly upholding it. Gordon, supra note 5, at 600 &
n.195, 611-13. The first widely-publicized decision upholding survivability, however,
was the 1972 lower court decision in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures Co., 172 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 541, 54849 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972), that was subsequently reversed in 70 Cal.
App. 3d 552, 139 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1977), aff'd, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 323 (1979). Survivability was not recognized in the New York federal district
courts until 1975, Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 844-47
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), and not by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit until 1978.
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 220-22 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. d-
nied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979). To date, the Second Circuit remains the only circuit that
recognizes survivability and that recognition is predicated on an "interpretation" of
New York law that has not yet been endorsed by the New York state courts.
Although the legislatures of several states have recognized the survivabiity of public-
ity rights, see notes 16, 48 supra, these were not jurisdictions upon whose actions
celebrities would have focused. In any event, none of these statutes require lifetime
exercise for the publicity rights to survive. See note 143 infra. Lifetime exercise as a
prerequisite to survivability of publicity rights was suggested in Guglielmi v. Spell-
ing-Goldberg Prods., 140 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1977), aff'd on other grounds, 25 Cal. 3d
860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979), although it is unclear from the appel-
late court's decision whether a mere assignment of publicity rights in gross would
have sufficed. See note 100 supra.
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will be used to examine the four predicate assumptions of the career
incentive theory: (1) the celebrity's belief that his publicity rights
would be legally enforceable, hence valuable, after his death; (2) the
celebrity's desire that the rights should survive in the hands of as-
signees, heirs, or other successors; and (3) that the celebrity's con-
templation of survivability created added career incentive, which (4)
may have resulted in additional career achievements from which soci-
ety benefited.
Regarding the first two assumptions, different types of assignments
permit different inferences. If a fixed-term contract assigning publi-
city rights expressly states that the parties can enforce their contract
rights notwithstanding the celebrity's death while the contract is
extant, this proviso suggests that the celebrity was at least con-
templating the survivability of his publicity rights. In the absence of
an explicit proviso, such inferences are difficult to draw from the
mere existence of a fixed-term contract, particularly in view of court
decisions rejecting survivability. Elvis Presley, for example, assigned
his rights by a series of fixed-term contracts, the last of which had
less than seven years to run at the time of his death. " ' Presley's
knowledge of the present value of his right of publicity is properly
inferrable from these contracts. It is more speculative to infer from
the mere existence of contracts that Presley believed that his public-
ity rights were survivable, as well as to make the additional assump-
tions respecting career motivation and achievement." '
By comparison, an inter vivos assignment of publicity rights in per-
petuity permits a strong inference that the celebrity was considering
the value of his publicity rights after his death, whether or not his
beliefs were legally well founded. Most celebrities, however, would
be reluctant to make an assignment of publicity rights in perpetuity
during their active careers, when the magnitude and duration of their
fame, and therefore its future commercial value, remain conjectural.
Rather, assignments in perpetuity are probably made by celebrities at
advanced ages or after retirement. Thus, the types of assignments
that most clearly evidence the celebrity's active contemplation of sur-
vivability are ironically those least likely to be made during the stage
of the celebrity's life at which they would evidence the third and
fourth assumptions of additional career incentive and additional
career achievement.
The case of the famous comedy team, Stan Laurel and Oliver
Hardy, is illustrative. Hardy died in 1957. In March 1961, Hardy's
widow joined Laurel in making an assignment in perpetuity of the
115. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 216-17 n.1 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
116. See notes 102-14 supra and accompanying text.
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publicity rights of both actors to a corporation that produced and dis-
tributed films and licensed toys and games. Thinking the rights of
neither celebrity survivable after Laurel's death in 1965, the assignee
reneged on the contract, and the widows of both men sued."7 Com-
mentators who favor the lifetime exercise requirement criticize the
federal district court for holding this contract enforceable by both
widows " because Hardy had never made an inter vivos assignment
in gross."9  Yet, Laurel made an assignment in perpetuity at the age
of seventy-one, only four years prior to his death, and more than ten
years after the comedy team's last cinematic ventures.'20 It is difficult
to see how his assignment shows career incentive. The argument that
Laurel "might" have been more highly motivated in an active career
that effectively ended in 1945121 because he lived to make an assign-
ment in 1961, while Hardy "could not" have been so motivated be-
cause he failed to do so, underscores the dubious logic of the lifetime
exercise requirement as applied in many contexts."
Advocates of the lifetime exercise requirement emphasize the nega-
tive presumption of the theory.'2 If the celebrity exercises his pub-
licity rights during his lifetime, they concede that his contemplation
of the survivability of those rights might not have led to greater
career incentive and achievement. 4 The), argue, however, that
117. Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 838-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
118. Id. at 845-47.
119. See Felcher & Rubin I, supra note 5, at 1618-19 & n.186.
120. See E. Katz, The Film Encyclopedia 696-97 (1979); Oxford Companion to
Film 410 (L. Bawden, ed. 1976); D. Thomson, A Biographical Dictionary 309-11
(1976).
121. See sources cited note 120 supra.
122. Commentators Felcher and Rubin, who favor the lifetime exercise require-
ment, suggest that a celebrity's "last-minute" assignment of publicity rights could be
voided by a court on "public policy" grounds. Such an assignment, they suggest,
might be a pro forma act designed to insure the survivability of the rights and not
related to genuine career incentive, being in that respect no better than a specific
devise of publicity rights in the celebrity's will. Felcher & Rubin I, supra note 5, at
1619. Notably, both the specific testamentary bequest and the "last-minute" assign-
ment of rights would at least evidence the celebrity's intention to bequeath the rights
for the benefit of heirs. Yet, apparently neither is deemed sufficient for purposes of
the career incentive theory. It is difficult to see why a different result should be
reached if the specific testamentary devise were made in a will that the celebrity
signed and had witnessed 20 years before his death. Conversely, if a "last-minute"
assignment is presumed to be a mere strategem, it is doubtful that any late-life
assignment separated by many years from the celebrity's active career, such as that
which Stan Laurel made (and which Felcher and Rubin imply sufficed, see note 81
supra and accompanying text), would sufficiently evidence added career motivation
and achievement.
123. See note 105 supra and accompanying text.
124. Felcher & Rubin It, supra note 5, at 1130-31; Feleher & Rubin I, su pra note
5, at 1619.
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without lifetime exercise, no additional incentive, achievement, or
societal benefit would have resulted. 11 The validity of this negative
presumption in every instance is questionable. Under common law or
statute, publicity rights are deemed conceptually complete and en-
forceable in the living celebrity's hands regardless of whether he has
affirmatively exercised them for profit. Furthermore, man), celebri-
ties have no desire to commercially exploit their names and
likenesses during their lifetimes for reasons of personal sensitivity or
professional judgment. ' A celebrity may perceive his fame as predi-
cated in part on the projection of a public image that might be under-
mined by promoting commercial products.' ' The same celebrity
may not have similar objections regarding post-mortem exploitations
and may hope that his children can profit from his fame in any way
possible.
Furthermore, many celebrities who are not averse to lifetime ex-
ploitations of their fame may simply miss the opportunity to effect
such transactions. This is particularly true if a celebrity dies suddenly
and prematurely at a stage in his career when he had not yet thought
it appropriate to enter into contracts for commercial exploitation, or
before the right offer had come along. If Rudolph Valentino had sur-
vived, for example, it is probable that he would have ultimately made
the same kind of late life assignment in gross as did his cinematic
contemporary, Stan Laurel."
Assuming arguendo that the absence of a lifetime exercise pre-
cludes the possibility of additional career incentive, the final assump-
tion of the career incentive theory-that additional incentive trans-
lates into additional career achievements that would not otherwise
occur-is extremely speculative. Even if Laurel were more talented
than Hardy, 3' it is doubtful that the members of the public, who
presumably benefit under the career incentive theory, would con-
clude that Hardy failed to perform up to his potential or that an%
difference between Laurel and Hardy's cinematic achievements
125. Felcher & Rubin II, supra note 5, at 1130-31. Felcher & Rubin 1. supra note
5, at 1619.
126. See note 48 supra.
127. Although celebrity interest in doing commercials has increased in the past
decade, many stars, such as Paul Newman, Liza Minnelli, Dustin Hoffman, and
Robert Redford, still decline to do commercial advertising. See generally Feinberg,
Madison Avenue's Cast of Famous Faces, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16. 1980, § F, at 7, col. 1.
128. See Treece, supra note 19, at 644-45.
129. For a case involving the question of a surviving right of publicity with respect
to Valentino, see Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860. 603 P.2d
454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979).
130. See Thomson, supra note 120, at 309 (quoting Leo McCarey).
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would justify a financial reward to the heirs of one and not the
other. 1"
At the heart of the issue, perhaps, is the assumption implicit in the
lifetime exercise requirement- that there is no societal interest in
recognizing descendible property rights other than those that directly
stimulate economic and intellectual enterprise through prospective
incentives, as opposed to rights that merely reward such enterprise
retrospectively. A discussion of this theory is beyond the scope of this
article. It is sufficient to note, however, that descendible property
rights in our present legal system are not so limited. For example,
the law permits tangible personal and real property to be transferred
from generation to generation in perpetuity, far in excess of any dura-
tion necessary to encourage the original entrepreneur to create or
acquire it. More relevant to the question of publicity rights, a ben-
eficiary under state intestacy statutes can succeed to the goodwill of
the decedent's business even though the decedent had worked to
establish that goodwill and died believing that no legal heirs survived
him and that the property would escheat to the state.132
In any event, neither the exercise nor the failure to exercise pub-
licity rights by the celebrity is conclusive with respect to his expecta-
tions, incentives, or achievements. The relationship among survivabil-
ity of publicity rights, lifetime exercise, and incremental career
achievement is quite speculative, particularly because survivability is
not yet recognized in most jurisdictions. Most celebrities devote
time, money, and energy to achievements from which society ben-
efits, and collaterally, to the creation of a commercially exploitable
fame comparable to goodwill. Yet, the lifetime exercise requirement
purports to vindicate only a social policy respecting achievement in-
centives, while it ignores the common law preference for the survival
of commercially valuable goodwill-type assets."'0 The logic of the life-
131. Moreover, to apply the lifetime exercise requirement so as to deny the in-
heritance of publicity rights to the heirs of Hardy or other celebrities who have made
substantial societal contributions in their careers would seem illogical in view of the
survivability of the publicity rights of Ms. Smith, our involuntary model, under the
very same standard. As previously discussed, the survivability of Ms. Smith's public-
ity rights serves no career incentive purpose outside of the field of commercial adver-
tising itself, wherein there is little societal interest in Ms. Smith's "achievements."
See notes 73-75 supra and accompanying text.
132. See notes 26-27 supra and accompanying text.
133. The lifetime exercise requirement does have the advantage of keeping in the
public domain the names and images of the vast majority of celebrities presently
deceased. Generally, this is because the survivability of publicity rights under com-
mon law has only been recently recognized, and because the financial incentives for
commercial exploitation of fame were not once what they are now. It is less certain
whether the lifetime exercise requirement would continue to serve this "function" in
the future were that standard formally adopted by courts or legislatures and publi-
cized in the legal community. Other rationales suggested for the lifetime exercise
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time exercise requirement is sufficiently tenuous that fairness re-
quires that any doubts be resolved in favor of the survivabilitv of the
celebrity's publicity rights for the benefit of his heirs.
B. Identification of Harm
The "identification of harm" approach, proposed by Felcher and
Rubin, requires that bequeathed publicity rights be "translated into
concrete form through the medium of a contract." ' The rationale is
that the existence of a contract entered into by the celebrity during
his lifetime enables courts to identify harm to the beneficiaries conse-
quential to a post-mortem infringement. In the absence of such a
contract, the injury asserted is considered too vague or remote to
constitute a basis for relief.1 r This approach may represent a stricter
lifetime exercise requirement for survivability by appearing to limit
post-mortem protection to unexpired contracts in which the celeb-
rity's heirs retain a beneficial interest."
requirement, in addition to the career incentive theory, are also not compelling. The
requirement could, for example, be perceived as formalizing, crystallizing, or reifying
the celebrity's publicity rights, see Felcher & Rubin II, supra note 5, at 1131, com-
parable to the requirement that copyrights, patents, and trademarks be registered in
order to be protected under federal or state statutes. See, e.g., Lanhan Act, § 1-45,
15 U.S.C. H8 1051-1127 (1976); Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. app. H8 101-810
(1976 & Supp. I 1977); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 368-b (McKinney 1968). note 220 infra.
To require that the celebrity exercise his publicity rights as a precondition to devis-
ing them is, however, asking much more of him than mere registration. Again, the
property interest assigned or devised by the celebrity is the public image that he has
sacrificed time, money, and personal effort to create. The celebrity's image and its
potential value exist not-withstanding the absence of lifetime commercial exploita-
tions, although those exploitations may add or detract therefrom. Most significantly,
under common law or statute, publicity rights are deemed conceptually complete
and enforceable in the living celebrity's hands even if he had not armatively exer-
cised them for profit, inasmuch as he can seek an injunction and a judgment for
damages against any infringer. See, e.g., Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F.
Supp. 836, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 880
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1980).
134. Felcher & Rubin II, supra note 5, at 1131. Contra, Memphis Dev. Founda-
tion v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 958 (6th Cir.), cerl. denied, 101 S. Ct. 358
(1980).
135. See Felcher & Rubin I, supra note 5, at 1609-16, 1618.
136. Id. at 1619 n.188. The authors state that "[t]ihe crucial question is
whether a person has actually developed a bona fide way to profit from his attributes,
and then left the instrumentality for doing so to his heirs." Id. If post-mortem pro-
tection is thus limited, publicity rights "survive" only insofar as a contract for their
exploitation is extant and effective at the time of the celebrity's death. If, on the
other hand, a celebrity never exploited his publicity rights while alive, or exploited
them only under fixed-term contracts that expired prior to his death, his publicity
rights would not "survive" his death. In this regard, Felcher and Rubin's comment
requires some clarification. Presumably, the "'instrumentality" for profiting from his
attributes, which the deceased celebrity "left . . . to his heirs," is an assignment or
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The "identification of harm" approach affirms Felcher and Rubin's
view that the career incentive theory for survivability is compelling
and should be dispositive of the issue.317 It is questionable, however,
whether the ability of the parties to point to specific contracts adds
anything in favor of the lifetime exercise requirement beyond a pre-
sumption of career incentive. Certainly, no contract is necessary for a
court to identify harm to a living celebrity due to misappropriation of
his right of publicity.-" Moreover, courts are usually quite capable of
identifying harm once they know the legal rights they are supposed
to protect. To reverse this process and in effect have the courts cre-
ate rights by first "identifying harm" is tautological. There may be a
certain jurisprudential satisfaction in limiting the courts' role to pro-
tecting existing contracts and thereby protecting what might be de-
scribed as "settled expectations." The expectations embodied in the
contract, however, are those of the deceased celebrity; whether his
heirs can succeed to these expectations is the very issue at hand. To
say that impairment of the value of the contract by infringement
"harms" the heirs merely begs the question whether the heir has a
legally cognizable right.
That the heirs can point to their rights under a specific contract is
not intrinsically significant. Otherwise, the "identifiable harm"
approach could not be the basis for concluding, as do Felcher and
Rubin, that, in the Price" case, Laurel's widow should have recov-
licensing agreement under which the celebrity received a specified percentage of the
assignee's or licensee's revenues as a form of royalty or license fee. Felcher and
Rubin's statement presumably refers to a stipulation common to such agreements
that in the event of the celebrity's death, his heirs would "step into his shoes" in the
contract and succeed to his rights to continuing payments. Thus, both the heirs and
the assignee/licensee would have financial incentive to protect the value of their con-
tract against misappropriators of the deceased's publicity rights. Assume, however,
that the living celebrity made an assignment in gross in perpetuity of his publicity
rights for a single fixed sum. At the celebrity's death, only the assignee will be
interested in protecting the value of this exclusive contract against misappropriators.
The celebrity's heirs would have no continuing interest in the contract, although, of
course, the lump sum payment received by their testator may have substantially
augmented the testamentary estate to which they have succeeded. This situation
would not seem to fit Felcher and Rubin's description of an instrumentality to profit
from the celebrity's attributes "left ... to his heirs." Nevertheless, it is probable
that Felcher and Rubin would deem such a lump sum assignment in perpetuity
contract survivable. Indeed, inasmuch as the living celebrity receives and can enjoy
advance payments for future post-mortem uses of his publicity rights, this type of
contract arguably provides the strongest case for applying the career incentive theory
in support of Felcher and Rubin's proposed lifetime exercise requirement.
137. Id. at 1618-22.
138. See, e.g., Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969); Ettore v.
Philco T.V. Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926
(1956); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Uhlaender v. Hen-
ricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970).
139. Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); see
notes 117-22 supra and accompanying text.
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ered and Hardy's widow should not have. "  Both widows had the
benefit of a specific contract, the value of which was being dimin-
ished by breach. Both Hardy's widow and the assignee had settled
expectations when they entered into the agreement, and arguably the
assignee would be unjustly enriched if he could renege on the royalty
payments to which he had agreed. Arguably, Hardy's widow had the
more settled expectations of the two widows because she herself was
a party to the contract that had been repudiated. Without reference
to the lifetime exercise requirement or the preclusive view of the
career incentive theory-the latter, notably, focusing on hypothe-
sized benefit to the public rather than "harm" to the rightholder-no
basis can be found for granting recovery only to Laurel's widow.
If publicity rights were recognized as surv'ivable generally, neither
the fact of injury nor the measurement of damages therefor"' would
be "vague" or "remote" or difficult to identify. '  Although it may
appear to represent an alternative conceptual approach to the prob-
lem, Felcher and Rubin's concept of identifiable harm does not take
us beyond the career incentive theory. Fairer and more rational prin-
ciples support the public interest in limiting the extent of survivabil-
ity of publicity rights.1"
140. See Felcher & Rubin I, supra note 5, at 1618-19 & n.186. notes 80-86 supra
and accompanying text. Indeed, in Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc.,
616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 358 (1980), the plaintiffs had the
benefit of a contract made with Elvis Presley during his life. Despite the resulting
settled expectations, the court concluded that "the right of publicity should not be
given the status of a devisable right, even where as here a person exploits the right
by contract during life." Id. at 958.
141. Damages for the infringement of the surviving right of publicity would nor-
mally be either: (1) an award of profits that the infringers are found to have diverted
from the rightholders, under a theory of tortious misappropriation of intangible prop-
erty; (2) an accounting of profits under equitable principles; or most likely, (3) an
award of royalties that the rightholders should in fairness have received for granting a
license, on quasi-contract theory. See Treece, supra note 19, at 648-54, Protection
for Public Figures, supra note 5, at 533; notes 21-25 supra and accompanying text.
See generally D. Dobbs, supra note 24, ch. 6. In all of these cases, notably, the
measurement of damages need not be specifically keyed to the terms of an unexpired
contract entered into by the celebrity during his lifetime; such a contract, however,
might be of evidentiary value with respect to the third type of damages. D. Dobbs,
supra note 24, § 6.6, at 496-99.
142. Felcher & Rubin I, supra note 5, at 1618, 1608-'_22
143. In accordance with the view that the lifetime exercise of publicity rights
should not be required for the rights to survive, see Price v. Hal Roach Studios,
Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Pilpel, supra note 5, at 257, Protection
for Public Figures, supra note 5, at 549. Notably, the four state statutes currently
recognizing the survivability of publicity rights, see notes 16, 48, supra, all implicitly
reject the necessity of lifetime exercise by the deceased. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 540.08
(West 1972) (if the deceased did not assign or license his rights, civil action maintain-
able "by any one from among a class composed of his surviving spouse and surviving
children"); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 839.2 (West Supp. 1980) (action for unautho-
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III. APPROPRIATE LIMITATIONS ON SURVIVABILITY
Social policies favoring free trade and free speech mandate the
limitation of the survivability of publicity rights with respect to both
scope and duration. Moreover, some limitations on the survivability
of publicity rights are necessary to eliminate, or at least to minimize,
conceptual inconsistencies with the non-survivability of the right to
privacy and the right to be free from defamation. The use of surviv-
ing publicity rights should basically be confined to vindicating the
successor's commercial interest against the misappropriation of the
deceased celebrity's name or likeness.'44 These rights should not be
used as substitutes for post-mortem false light or defamation actions,
or for analogous purposes whereby the emotional interests of the de-
ceased or his successors or even the pecuniary interests of the succes-
sors in upholding the character reputation of the deceased are
vindicated. "'
A. Free Trade and the Commerce Clause
The free trade interest in keeping the names and likenesses of de-
ceased celebrities in the public domain is an important policy consid-
eration for limiting the survivability of publicity rights.14' From the
time that "George Washington slept here" until quite recently,
American entrepreneurs could capitalize without restriction upon the
fame of deceased celebrities. Such exploitations have undoubtedly be-
come an essential part of our national system of advertising and
promotion. It is doubtful, however, that the commerce clause," of
the United States Constitution protects such commercializations
against the enforcement of surviving publicity rights under state law.
Apparently, Congressional enactment of copyright and patent statutes
pursuant to constitutional authorization was riot intended to preempt
state laws recognizing rights of publicity. 14' Therefore, unless the
Supreme Court determines that the enforcement of survivable public-
ity rights under widely varying state laws impedes interstate com-
rized misappropriation maintainable by the "surviving spouse, personal representa-
tives or a majority of the adult heirs of a deceased person"); Utah Code Ann. §
76-9-406 (1978) (heirs of the deceased may sue); Va. Code § 8.01-40 (1977) (action
maintainable by the "surviving consort and if none, . . the next of kin").
144. See Protection for Public Figures, supra note 5, at 549; note 85 suspra and
accompanying text; note 99 supra.
145. See pt. I(C)&(D) supra.
146. See Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 959-60
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 358 (1980).
147. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
148. See H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 132 [hereinafter cited as
House Report], reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5659, 5748. Sec-
tion 301(b)(3) states that "[n]othing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies
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merce and requires either uniform national regulation by Congress or
no restriction at all,149 the free enterprise problem must be weighed
as a policy consideration only."z
B. First Amendment Limitations and the Media
Rights of publicity, whether asserted by the celebrity while alive or
by heirs or assignees after his death, are subject to first and four-
teenth amendment m constraints that neither Congress nor the states
shall abridge freedom of speech or of the press. In applying the first
amendment, the Supreme Court's present tendency is to balance the
societal interest in the speech for which protection is sought against
the competing interests that favor its restraint." The nature of the
constitutional interest in free speech has been the subject of much
under the common law or statutes of any State with respect to ... activities violat-
ing legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to all. of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106." 17 U.S.C. app.
§ 301(b)(3) (1976 & Supp. 1 1977). Until shortly before the passage of the new Copy-
right Act, the bill enumerated various state doctrines that were not considered to be
the equivalent of copyright. S.22, § 301(b)(3), 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 Cong. Ree.
3841, 3849 (1976). Although this list was deleted in the final enactment, the House
Report indicated that "[t]he evolving common law rights of 'privacy,' 'publicity," and
trade secrets, and the general laws of defamation and fraud, would remain unaffected
as long as the causes of action contain elements, such as an invasion of personal rights
or a breach of trust or confidentiality, that are different in kind from copyright infringe-
ment." House Report, supra at 132, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 5748. In Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), the district court on remand denied defendant's motion to vacate the prelimi-
nary injunction and held that federal copyright law did not preempt the state law
right of publicity. Id. at 1097-1100. Defendant's "memorial" poster of Elvis Presley
was held to have violated plaintiff assignee's right of publicity, notwithstanding the
fact that the defendant's poster and the photograph incorporated therein were copy-
righted. Id. at 1104.
149. See generally Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886);
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1851). Notably, a commerce
clause argument has not figured prominently in the constitutional defenses of alleged
infringers or publicity rights. See, e.g., Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, Factors Etc.,
Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
150. Cf. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (upholding California law
making the commercial reproduction of sound recordings a misdemeanor, in the ab-
sence of congressional action to prevent such "record piracy").
151. U.S. Const. amends. I & XIV.
152. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976) C'([T]he prohibition on
encroachment of First Amendment protections is not an absolute. Restraints are per-
mitted for appropriate reasons."). Notably, state protection of publicity rights does
not represent a suppression of ideas by government motivated by fear of their com-
municative impact on the listener-the type of regulation that the Court has voided
under rationales in which this "balancing process" may have been less obvious. See,
e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen's Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96
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debate. Some views emphasize the importance of the personal fulfill-
ment of the speaker; - others emphasize the value to society of the
interchange of ideas."" Although both purposes may be served with-
out necessarily deprecating the importance of free speech to the
speaker, the Court has emphasized the social purposes of the
guarantee. 1
1. Newsworthy materials
Foremost among the social functions of the first amendment is the
maintenance of the democratic process itself. Speech that conveys in-
formation or ideas necessary for the public to make intelligent politi-
cal decisions must be protected.'6 This principle has been extended
in favor of virtually all dissemination of news or other information of
public interest.' 57 Therefore, if a cogent argument can be made that
a media presentation respecting a celebrity is newsworthy or of pub-
lic interest, the right of publicity cannot be successfully asserted to
obtain either injunctive prior restraint or recoupment of commercial
profits except in the most blatantly exploitative and injurious situa-
tions. In Current Audio, Inc. v. RCA Corp.," a forthcoming news
magazine contained, in addition to the traditional format, a stereo
phonograph record of interviews and comments by most of the per-
sons mentioned in its articles. Two and a half of the forty-five min-
utes on the phonograph record consisted of portions of a taped press
conference given by Elvis Presley as part of the promotion of the
popular singer's upcoming live performance at Madison Square Gar-
den. RCA, which was planning a record release of these perform-
ances and which had an exclusive contract to make and sell phono-
(1972); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 599-604 (1967); Mills v. Ala-
bama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-20 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
271 (1964); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-2 (1978).
153. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971); L. Tribe, supra note 152,
§ 12-1, at 578-79. See generally Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 Phil.
& Pub. Aff. 204 (1971).
154. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S 765, 776-77 (1978); Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
765 (1976); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Thornhill
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940). See generally A. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom
(1960).
155. See cases cited note 154 supra.
156. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-77 (1978); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969)
(per curiam); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337
U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
157. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (protecting advertising of prices of prescription
drugs); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (protecting the teaching of foreign
languages); Gordon, supra note 5, at 571-81.
158. 71 Misc. 2d 831, 337 N.Y.S.2d 949 (Sup. Ct. 1972),
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graph records of Elvis' performances, sought a preliminary injunction
against the sale of Current Audio magazine. Although the record it-
self could have been viewed as a mere commercial product, the court
perceived it as a novel variation of traditional news-disseminating
media.'59 The court deemed the newsworthiness of the press confer-
ence by the prominent singer to be "self-evident," '' and denied the
injunction. 6
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.' represents the
seemingly rare case in which the traditional media so exceed their
constitutional license to depict newsworthy events that a state-
recognized right of publicity is held to prevail. Zacchini was an enter-
tainer who, as a "human cannonball," was shot from a cannon into a
net some 200 feet away. Against Zacchini's explicit request, a re-
porter for the defendant broadcasting company filmed the entire act,
which lasted about fifteen seconds, and the filn was shown on the
defendant's television news program. Ohio's supreme court recog-
nized Zacchini's right to the publicity value of his performance, but
denied his action for damages on the ground that the broadcast was
privileged under the first amendment. ' The United States Supreme
Court, by a narrow majority, reversed and upheld Zacchini's right of
publicity over the television station's first amendment claim." The
Court emphasized that the unauthorized broadcast of Zacchini's en-
tire act drew off Zacchini's potential customers and thus went "to the
heart of petitioner's ability to earn a living as an entertainer."I"5
Moreover, the Court emphasized that Zacchini was not seeking to en-
join the broadcast of his performance, but only seeking payment for
it.'- Although upholding an entertainer's right of publicity in the
face of a first amendment defense, the Zacchini decision may be lim-
ited to circumstances in which a performer's entire act is appropri-
ated and only compensation is sought, as opposed to a prior
restraint. 67 Furthermore, the Court's concern that the media's
appropriation would destroy the performer's ability to earn a living
would obviously be irrelevant in the post-mortem context.
159. Id. at 837, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 955-56.
160. Id. at 836, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 955.
161. Id. at 837, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 956.
162. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
163. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.. 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, "224-36.
351 N.E.2d 454, 458-62 (1976), rev'd, 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
164. 433 U.S. 562, 578-79.
165. Id. at 576.
166. Id. at 578.
167. See Note, First Amendment Theory Applied to the Right of Publicity, 19
B.C.L. Rev. 277, 282-85 (1975); Note, The Supreme Court, 1976 Ten. 91 larv. L.
Rev. 70, 212-14 (1977); Note, Human Cannonballs and the First Amendment. Z-ac-
chini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 30 Stan. L. Rev. 1185. 1189-1204 1978).
But see 31 Rutgers L. Rev. 269, 306 (1978).
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2. Biographies and fiction
Beyond the dissemination of news and information, the first
amendment also protects the public's interest in being entertained
and culturally stimulated, 1' as well as the individual's interest in ex-
pressing his creativity." Except for obscenity, 70 therefore, both ficti-
tious and factual communications enjoy a presumption of constitu-
tional protection.'" This protection is particularly relevant when
rights of publicity are asserted against unauthorized biographies and
fictitious accounts depicting the celebrity. The "factual biography" is
essentially accurate, though it may contain inadvertent or minor in-
accuracies. Alternatively, true fiction may depict the celebrity as a
central or incidental character, but is clearly recognizable as fiction
only. Somewhere between biography and fiction lies the "purported
biography," which appears to be a factual biography, but nevertheless
contains substantial, presumably deliberate, ictionalizations"
Precedents suggest that the purported biography, being neither
accurately informative nor creatively fictitious, may fall outside the
ambit of constitutional protection and be subject to right of publicity
claims. 713  In Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 74 for example, the
famous baseball pitcher Warren Spahn obtained a judgment for an
injunction and damages against the publishers of an unauthorized
biography that had been dramatized and fictionalized to appeal to a
juvenile readership. Although the treatment was laudatory, it in-
168. Zacehini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977);
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952); Winters v. New York, 333
U.S. 507, 510 (1948). In Winters, the Court stated that "[t]he line between the
informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic right,
Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction. What is one man's
amusement, teaches another's doctrine." Id. See generally Feleher & Rubin I, supra
note 5, at 1598.
169. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). See generally L. Tribe, supra
note 152, § 12-1, at 578-79; Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amend-
ment, 72 Yale L.J. 877. 879-80 (1963).
170. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
171. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977);
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495, 501 (1952); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948); Minarcini v.
Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976); University of Notre
Dame Du Lac v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 22 A.D.2d 452, 458, 256
N.Y.S.2d 301, 307, aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 940, 207 N.E.2d 508, 259 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1965);
Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods. 25 Cal. 3d 860, 867-68, 603 P.2d 454, 458-59,
160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 356-57 (1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring).
172. See Felcher & Rubin I, supra note 5, at 1596-1605.
173. See Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543, 274
N.Y.S.2d 877 (1966), vacated, 387 U.S. 239, aff'd, 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d 8,0,
286 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1967).
174. Id.. 221 N.E.2d 543. 274 N.Y.S.2d 877.
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eluded substantial distortions, imagined dialogue, and fabrications of
events. On remand, the New York Court of Appeals held that public
figures can recover for the publication of unauthorized biographies if
they can show that the presentation is infected with material and sub-
stantial falsification, and that the work was published with knowledge
of such falsification or with a reckless disregard for the truth.'17
Spahn can be viewed as vindicating both the celebrity's "privacy"
interest in being free from false light depiction, and his "publicity"
interest in being free from commercial misappropriation, despite the
defendants' assertion of first amendment privilege.'" It is difficult,
however, to determine which of Spahn's "interests"-the emotional
one of "privacy" or the commercial one of "publicity"-was para-
mount in the minds of the judges. From the standpoint of false light
depiction, Spahn may reflect the traditional judicial reluctance to rec-
ognize constitutional protection for deliberately false and misleading
speech about other persons, even "public persons."' From the
standpoint of misappropriation, Spahn may imply, in the words of
one commentator, that "the purported biography is just another com-
mercial product that uses the name of its subject to attract attention,
i.e., for purposes of trade.'" Any unauthorized but factual biogra-
phy, or any fictionalization capitalizing on the celebrity's name,
however, might be similarly characterized. The distinction has been
justified on the theory that the purported biography, lacking the in-
formativeness of the factual biography and the creativity of true fic-
tion, serves no purposes warranting first amendment protection.' '
Yet the Spahn defendants may have been extremely creative in their
invention of dialogue and their work may have been generally in-
formative. It therefore appears that if the false light depiction-
emotional disturbance element of the Spahn case-was not the pri-
mary factor in the court's decision, it was certainly an indispensable
175. 21 N.Y.2d at 127, 233 N.E.2d at 842, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 834. The United
States Supreme Court vacated the first judgment of the New York Court of Appeals
and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). In Hill, the Court had held that damages for false-light
depiction of an individual's personal life could be recovered under a state right-to-
privacy statute only upon a showing of knowing falsehood or reckless disregard for
the truth. 385 U.S. at 387-88. On reargument, the New York court held that Spahn
had met this standard, and affirmed. 21 N.Y.2d at 127, 233 N.E.2d at 842, 286
N.Y.S.2d at 834.
176. See pt. I(C) supra.
177. See Sinatra v. Wilson, 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2008, 2010 (S.D.N.Y. 1977
Protection for Public Figures, supra note 5, at 553-54.
178. Protection for Public Figures, supra note 5, at 554.
179. See Felcher & Rubin I, supra note 5, at 1604-05.
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one; 8 ° the decision could not have rested on the misappropriation
theory alone.
Applying New York law, the federal court in Hicks v. Casablanca
Records 8' assumed that the Spahn rule might apply to a post-mortem
assertion of publicity rights. The heirs and assignees of the late mys-
tery writer Agatha Christie sought to enjoin the distribution of a mo-
tion picture and a book that presented a fictionalized account of a
true incident in Mrs. Christie's life-her unexplained disappearance
for eleven days in 1926. Although the reasons for Mrs. Christie's dis-
appearance and her whereabouts during this period remain a mystery
to this day, the defendants' book and movie suggested that an emo-
tionally unstable Mrs. Christie had used her disappearance to plot
the murder of her husband's mistress in an effort to regain his affec-
tions. The Hicks plaintiffs brought their action on a theory of infringe-
ment of the right of publicity. Relying on the Second Circuit's decision
in Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.,' the district court recog-
nized the right as survivable because Mrs. Christie had exercised it
during her lifetime.""3 The court, however, indicated that the princi-
180. See Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 329, 221 N.E.2d 543,
545, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877, 880 (1966), vacated, 387 U.S. 239, aff'd, 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233
N.E.2d 840, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1967). Judge Keating stated that "it is erroneous to
confuse privacy with 'personality' or to assume that privacy, though lost for a certain
time or in a certain context, goes forever unprotected. Thus it may be appropriate to
say that the plaintiff here, Warren Spahn, is a public personality and that, insofar as
his professional career is involved, he is substantially without a right to privacy. That
is not to say, however, that his 'personality' may be fictionalized and that, as fic-
tionalized, it may be exploited for the defendants' commercial benefit through the
medium of an unauthorized biography." Id. at 328, 221 N.E.2d at 545, 274 N.Y.S.2d
at 879 (citations omitted). In the lower court opinion, Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc.,
23 A.D.2d 216, 221, 260 N.Y.S.2d 451, 456 (1965), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221
N.E.2d 543, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1966), vacated, 387 U.S. 239, aff'd, 21 N.Y.2d 124,
233 N.E.2d 840, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1967), Judge Breitel stated "that a public figure
is subject to being exposed in a factual biography, even one which contains inadver-
tent or superficial inaccuracies. But surely, he should not be exposed, without his
control, to biographies not limited substantially to the truth. The fact that the fic-
tionalized treatment is laudatory is immaterial, except perhaps as it may influence
the assessment of damages, for three reasons. In the first place, a laudatory treat-
ment may make one appear more ridiculous than a factual one, at least to those who
know enough of the truth. In the second place, one may have strong feelings about
not being portrayed in any exaggerated light. Lastly, there may be serious difficulties
in determining what is laudatory. So long as it is not the truth, the subject of the
distorted biography ought to have the right to permit or prevent its being pub-
lished."
181. 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
182. 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
183. 464 F. Supp. at 429-30. The court found the requisite lifetime exploitation in
various assignments of literary rights that Mrs. Christie had made during her lifetime
and by testamentary disposition. Id. Felcher and Rubin suggest that these actions
should not have sufficed. See Felcher & Rubin I, supra note 5, at 1620 n. 190.
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pie limiting the Spahn rule was that of University of Notre Dame
Du Lac v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.'" In Notre Dame, the
New York Court of Appeals had suggested that the first amendment
might prevent enjoining a clearly fictitious movie satirizing a colle-
giate football program." The Hicks court concluded that in light of
Notre Dame, the Spahn rule should apply only if deliberate falsifica-
tions had been made by the defendants and if it was not evident to
the public that the events depicted in the media were fictitious.,"
The court then denied the injunction to the Hicks plaintiffs because
they failed to allege that the falsifications had been made deliberately,
and because the appearance of the words "A Novel" on the cover
of the book made it evident to the public that the events depicted
were fictitious. "
Hicks properly narrows Spahn's category of "purported" and consti-
tutionally unprivileged biographies to those works whose fictional
aspect is neither self-evident nor clearly labelled. Its implication that
Spahn could be relevant to purported biographies of deceased celeb-
rities, however, seems incorrect. The false light depiction of the liv-
ing celebrity, with its ramifications for the latter's personal feelings,
was at least an indispensable element in the Spahn ruling.' After
the celebrity's death, however, his emotional interests against false
light or defamatory depiction can and should no longer be
vindicated."1 With these elements missing, the right of publicity ac-
tion against the purported biography of a deceased celebrity presents
only a bare misappropriation claim balanced against the defendant's
claim of first amendment privilege. In this context, the first amend-
ment should invariably prevail."'
Indeed, the Hicks decision treated the misappropriation aspect of
the case as virtually irrelevant. The defendants' use of Mrs. Christie's
fame to "package" their fiction was certainly as egregious as any ac-
tions taken by the Spahn "biographers," particularly inasmuch as the
Hicks defendants used a pejorative, if not defamatory, depiction to
arouse public interest. Nevertheless, the Hicks court, finding the
most minimal labelling and making the very tenuous assumption that
the public would recognize this work as fictitious, upheld the consti-
tutional defense. Moreover, the Spahn standard, adopted by the
Hicks court, requiring that the defendants deliberately falsify the
184. 15 N.Y.2d 940, 207 N.E.2d 508, 259 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1965).
185. Id. at 954, 207 N.E.2d at 517, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
186. Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 432-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
187. Id. at 433.
188. See note 180 supra and accompanying text.
189. See pts. I(C), (D) supra.
190. See notes 144-45, 151-55, 168-72 supra and accompanying text.
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account has nothing to do with misappropriation at all. Rather, it is
merely the "malice" standard for false light depiction by which the
Spahn court conformed to the United States Supreme Court's ruling
balancing the right to privacy against the first amendment in Time,
Inc. v. Hill.9'
Consequently, even if a Spahn-type biography of a deceased
celebrity is someday found, no reason justifies subjecting it to surviv-
ing right of publicity claims if both unauthorized but more accurate,
biographies and unauthorized, but more blatantly fictitious, accounts
are deemed constitutionally protected. If there is a public interest in
having fictionalizations of the lives of historical personages clearly
identified as such, the right of publicity is not the proper mechanism
to enforce that interest. It follows that the surviving right of publicity
should be limited to misappropriations respecting commercial prod-
ucts or merchandise.
C. First Amendment and Commercial Items
Commercial speech, such as advertising, is no longer deemed to be
totally devoid of first amendment protection, particularly when that
speech is of an informative nature.' In contrast to the media,
however, commercial products or merchandise are not generally con-
sidered to represent a mode of expression,'93 and constitutional in-
terests in this area are deemed to be low. 9 4 The unauthorized use of
a celebrity's name or likeness for portrayal on or promotion of a piece
of merchandise is considered the very essence of commercial
191. 385 U.S. 374 (1967); see note 175 supra.
192. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350. 379-82 (1977) (state may not
prohibit lawyers from advertising their fees for routine legal services); Linmark
Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 94-96 (1977) (township ordi-
nance may not prohibit the posting of real estate "For Sale" and "Sold" signs in effort
to prevent flight from community in process of becoming integrated); Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761-70
(1976) (state may not prevent pharmacist from advertising the prices of legal prescrip-
tion drugs); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818-25 11975) (state may not prohibit
advertisement offering referral service for abortions); L. Tribe, supra note 152,
§ 12-15; Felcher & Rubin I, supra note 5, at 1599 n.101.
193. See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 479 F. 2d 215, 219-22 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc., 96
N.J. Super. 72, 75-80, 232 A.2d 458, 459-62 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967); Rosemont
Enterprises, Inc. v. Choppy Prods., Inc., 74 Misc. 2d 1003, 1005-06, 347 N.Y.S.2d
83, 85 (Sup. Ct. 1972); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Sys., Inc., 72 Misc. 2d
788, 790-91, 340 N.Y.S.2d 144, 146-47 (Sup. Ct.), modified, 42 A.D.2d 544, 345
N.Y.S.2d 17 (1973).
194. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (declining to enjoin en-
forcement of ordinance against the distribution in the streets of commercial advertis-
ing handbills). See generally L. Tribe, supra note 152, § 12-15.
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misappropriation." In the absence of a first amendment counter-
weight, the right of publicity has been successfully asserted to pre-
vent and obtain damages for sale of such "celebrity merchandise."",
Courts have peremptorily rejected the idea that posters, games, or
other celebrity memorabilia convey speech of constitutional signifi-
cance, perhaps because the commercial motivation of the merchandis-
ers is so apparent that the courts seriously doubt whether any mes-
sage, other than "buy me," is intended.' " Except in the unusual
case like the magazine record in Current Audio v. RCA Corp., the
courts do not perceive mere merchandise as comparable to the tradi-
tional media with which the dissemination of constitutionally pro-
tected speech is associated.'
An exception to the general rule is the political poster, a type of
"celebrity merchandise" that has been accorded first amendment pro-
tection in the face of right of publicity claims. In Paulsen v. Personal-
ity Posters, Inc.,2°° Pat Paulsen, a well-known television performer
and comedian who had entered the 1968 presidential race for satiric
purposes, sought unsuccessfully to enjoin the unauthorized issuance
of a poster depicting him in comical garb over the caption "For Presi-
dent." Noting that Paulsen's candidacy had already drawn much
attention from the media and the public, the court concluded that the
poster conveyed a message of public interest, even if satirical,' like
the movie in the Notre Dame case. -"  The poster was, moreover,
deemed political commentary,0 which is usually accorded the highest
first amendment protection. 4
The holding in Paulsen, however, has been limited to its facts.4' 3 In
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.,' a defendant, seeking to take
advantage of the popular demand for Elvis Presley memorabilia im-
mediately following the death of the popular entertainer, published
and marketed a poster bearing a copyrighted photograph of Presley
195. See FeIcher & Rubin I, supra note 5, at 1606.
196. See cases cited note 193 supra.
197. Id.
198. Current Audio, Inc. v. RCA Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 831, 337 N.Y.S.2d 949 (Sup.
Ct. 1972); see notes 158-60 supra and accompanying text.
199. See pt. III(B) supra.
200. 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
201. Id. at 449-50, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 507-08.
202. University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. Twentieth Centur.-Fox Film Corp., 2
A.D.2d 452, 256 N.Y.S.2d 301, aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 940, 207 N.E.2d 508, 259 N.Y.S.2d
832 (1965).
203. 59 Misc. 2d at 449-50, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 507-08.
204. See pt. III(B)(1) supra.
205. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Sys., Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 788, 790, 340
N.Y.S.2d 144, 146 (Sup. Ct.), modified, 42 A.D.2d 544, 345 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1973).
206. 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
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purchased from a newspaper reporter and the caption "IN MEMORY,
• .. 1935-1977." 2'7 Pro Arts asserted that its "memorial poster
informed the public of and commemorated a newsworthy event,
conveying a message about Elvis'.life by depicting him in his
prime.' The Second Circuit rejected outright the analogy to Paulsen
and affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction to
the assignee of Presley's publicity rights.20
Similarly, manufacturers of unauthorized "celebrity games" exploit-
ing well-known professional golfers10 and billionaire recluse Howard
Hughes211 have been unsuccessful in defending publicity infringement
suits on the theory that games are constitutionally privileged because
they are comparable to biographies in communicating information
about the celebrity. In these cases the courts in effect conceded
that the games did disseminate biographical data.211 Nevertheless, in
upholding the celebrity's right of publicity against the purported con-
stitutional interest of the public in such "education," the courts
appear to have been swayed by the blatant commercial misappropria-
tion by the manufacturers and by the untraditional conception of
board games as media.1 3
Unfortunately, the courts have difficulty recognizing the special
and distinct contribution that posters, games, and other celebrity
memorabilia make to the "marketplace of ideas." To appreciate this
contribution, a different perspective on merchandise as "media" is
required. Within the traditional media, newspaper editors, television
broadcasters, book authors, and movie directors are perceived as the
"'speakers" who are trying to convey their message or information to
the members of the public, the "listeners." The constitutional signifi-
cance of mass-merchandised celebrity memorabilia, however, is bet-
ter perceived by identifying the important "speakers" to be the
207. Id. at 217.
208. Id. at 219, 222.
209. Id. at 222.
210. Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458
(Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967).
211. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Sys., Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 788, 790, 340
N.Y.S.2d 144, 146 (Sup. Ct.), modified, 42 A.D.2d 544, 345 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1973).
212. Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 74, 232 A.2d 458,
459 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Sys., Inc., 72
Misc. 2d 788, 789, 340 N.Y.S.2d 144, 145 (Sup. Ct.), modified, 42 A.D.2d 5,14, 345
N.Y.S.2d 17 (1973). The lower court in Rosemont stated that "the commodity or
article sold is closely identifiable with the major events in the plaintiff's career." 72
Misc. 2d at 789, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 146.
213. See 72 Misc. 2d at 790, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 146. See generally Treece, supra
note 19, at 665-68. The holding in Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d
444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1968), implies that games might be privileged if the
subject is a political figure. See notes 200-04 supra and accompanying text.
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memorabilia-purchasing public, rather than the merchandisers or
retailers.
The purchase and display of a poster or other form of celebrity
memorabilia is a statement by the individual of esteem for-or, in
some cases, ridicule of-the celebrity subject. Each purchaser is in
this sense a "speaker," and for most individuals, only the human
voice offers a comparable medium of personal expression. The display
of celebrity memorabilia not only serves the important purpose of
emotive fulfillment, but also makes a statement to those with whom
one comes in contact. It is an invitation to discussion that might
clarify an otherwise ambiguous expression. In the case of mass-
merchandised memorabilia such as the Elvis Presley posters, the col-
lective impact of thousands, perhaps millions, of such personal state-
ments may represent a significant statement to contemporary society
as well as to later generations because of the sentimental and financial
value of such "collectibles." The purchase and display of celebrity
memorabilia does not, therefore, represent public access to media-
disseminated information or entertainment as much as it becomes a
form of public expression through a "media" of its own.
The first amendment's a priori concern for the protection of politi-
cally oriented speech, reaffirmed in the Paulsen decision,"' has
broader implications when viewed from the perspective of the
memorabilia-purchaser as "speaker." Many athletes and entertainers
who have never tossed their hats into the political arena are associ-
ated in the minds of their admirers and critics with ideas that in
addition to being of public interest, are often distinctly political in
nature. Some, like Jane Fonda and Vanessa Redgrave, have deliber-
ately associated themselves with specific political causes. Others, such
as John Wayne, Jesse Owens, and the 1980 United States Olympic
Hockey Team, have willingly or unwillingly become associated with
patriotism by virtue of their exploits, celluloid or otherwise. Count-
less celebrities, from Muhammed Ali to Frank Sinatra, are for many
admirers symbolic of racial or ethnic pride. Indeed, it is arguable that
any generation's choice of heroes and villains is a statement of politi-
cal significance as well as a commentary about the times.
The Supreme Court has already recognized the first amendment's
protection of "symbolic speech" by the individual. '" What is often
214. Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501
(Sup. Ct. 1968); see notes 200-04 supra and accompanying text.
215. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (protecting display of
upside down flag with a peace symbol affixed as protest against Cambodian invasion
and Kent State killings); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (protecting wearing of black armbands by students as
protest against Vietnam War); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette. 319 U.S 624
(1943) (school children cannot be compelled to salute flag). L. Tribe, supra note 152,
§ 12-13.
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overlooked, however, is the special role of mass-merchandised
memorabilia as the "media" that facilitates this symbolic speech, or
even makes it possible initially. People wishing to express themselves
in this manner could be expected to make their own posters, or sten-
cil their own T-shirts, but obviously this would not be a practical
alternative. Most individuals lack the talent or the means for such
personal expression, and the societal impact of "mass expression"
would be diluted if not eliminated.
Often the celebrity's heirs or assignees will be happy to authorize
for manufacture and sale all of the memorabilia that the public needs,
and the only issue is whether they should receive the financial ben-
efit from these enterprises. The would-be merchandisers, however,
may be unable to come to terms with the celebrity's successors.
Moreover, the heirs or assignees may seek to suppress certain types
of memorabilia for reasons of personal sentiment or financial judg-
ment. Again, the right of publicity can be used to suppress critical or
unflattering commentary about the celebrity on a misappropriation
theory alone. In Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Choppy Productions,
Inc.,"6 for example, Howard Hughes successfully enjoined the unau-
thorized manufacture and sale of T-shirts and sweatshirts depicting
him in a comical and satirical manner. The defendants' first amend-
ment defenses were rejected. 17 Although the "message" of the
Howard Hughes T-shirts might have been somewhat ambiguous,
most of us would have gotten its drift. The idea that the accumulation
of vast sums of money does not necessarily mean happiness or social
ease is, like the myth of Midas, a pertinent statement within our free
enterprise society. This message does not seem less significant from
the standpoint of the first amendment than the blatantly appropria-
tive "Agatha" accounts deemed constitutionally immune to both in-
junction and damages in the Hicks case."'6 Nor is it clear that fewer
people would have been exposed to the message on the T-shirts than
those who took the time and expense to read the unauthorized
biography of Howard Hughes, which the courts in another case re-
fused to enjoin on first amendment grounds.219
Significantly, if the result in Choppy Productions was not ideal
when Hughes was alive, it would be even more troublesome if an
analogous result were reached after Hughes' death. Hughes' emo-
tional interest in preventing pejorative depictions of himself is a per-
216. 74 Misc. 2d 1003, 347 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
217. Id. at 1005, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
218. Hicks v. Casablanca, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); see notes 181-91
supra and accompanying text.
219. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1, 6, 294
N.Y.S.2d 122, 129 (Sup. Ct. 1968), aff'd mem., 32 A.D.2d 892, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948
(1969).
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sonal one and should not be vindicated after his death by the asser-
tion of surviving publicity rights. '  Moreover, it is in the period
immediately following the celebrity's death that his contemporaries
have a prime opportunity to make a judgment of their own for the
benefit of history. In this respect, other forms of commercial exploita-
tion are also part of the societal dialogue and can be instructive to
succeeding generations. The omnipresence of commercial enterprises
and apartment complexes trading on the names of Washington,
Lincoln, Roosevelt, and Kennedy, and the absence of similar "memo-
rials" to Arthur, Harding, and Coolidge, is a collective statement of
sorts.
Emphatically, the preceding discussion is not intended to suggest
that state or federal recognition of publicity rights enforceable against
purely commercial appropriations during the celebrity's lifetime or
thereafter would violate the first and fourteenth amendments. Rather,
it is only intended to suggest that aside from the free enterprise in-
terests previously discussed, more constitutional interest in "mere"
commercial appropriations of the celebrity's name and image exists
than has been previously suggested. Moreover, this interest may be
more acute when the celebrity is dead and history passes judgment
on him for the benefit of our descendants.
IV. SUMMARY AND PROPOSALS
The right of publicity should be survivable generally in the hands
of heirs, beneficiaries, and assignees because of its essentially pro-
prietary nature, comparable to other intangible property rights that
are survivable, such as goodwill and copyrights. Survivability also
ensures continued prevention of unjust enrichment by those who
would capitalize without charge on the fame that the celebrity estab-
lished through the expenditure of time, money, and effort. Surviva-
bility, moreover, may also serve as additional career incentive during
the celebrity's lifetime, perhaps leading to achievements of which
society would otherwise have been deprived. On the other hand,
neither the relationship between career incentive and the celebrity's
exercise or failure to exercise his publicity rights, nor the relationship
between added incentive and added achievement, is sufficiently clear
or established to justify discrimination against the heirs of celebrities
who did not exercise their rights.
In any event, the survivability of publicity rights must be circum-
scribed to vindicate societal interests in and constitutional guarantees
of free enterprise and free speech, as well as to minimize possible
conceptual discrepancies with the non-survivability of the rights to
220. See pts. I(C), (D) supra.
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privacy and to be free of defamation. Survivable publicity rights
should be assertable only against purely commercial exploitations of
the celebrity's name and image. Because there are free trade and free
speech interests even in these appropriations, an optimal solution
would be a mandatory license comparable to that required for several
types of copyrights under federal statute.22' Unfortunately, a manda-
tory licensing scheme would be unfeasible without legislation and a
formal registration system.
Like copyrights, surviving publicity rights should also be limited as
to duration. It has been suggested that the same free enterprise and
free speech considerations weighed in limiting the duration of copy-
rights are pertinent to the survivability of publicity rights, and that
courts can look to the present fifty-year post-mortem duration of
copyrights under the 1976 statute for legislative guidance."z With
respect to providing additional career incentive and stimulating addi-
tional career achievement, however, it is doubtful that publicity
rights have the same impact as copyrights.2 Additionally, in the
case of many celebrities, the commercial value of their publicity
rights declines fairly rapidly after death.22
The survivability period for publicity rights should therefore be sig-
nificantly shorter, perhaps between five and ten years.' A five-year
221. Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-810 (1976 & Supp.
I 1977), compulsory licenses are provided for the recording and distributing of
phonorecords of nondramatic musical compositions, id. app. § 115, juke-box perform-
ances of nondramatic musical works, id. app. § 116, retransmissions by cable tele-
vision of copyrighted works, id. app. § 111, and broadcasting and other uses of non-
dramatic musical works and published pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works by
public (noncommercial) broadcasting stations. Id. app. § 118.
222. See, e.g., Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 847-48, 603 P.2d 425,
446-47, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 344-45 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting); Felcher & Rubin
II, supra note 5, at 1129-32; Descent of the Right of Publicity, supra note 5, at 773;
Dracula's Progeny, supra note 5, at 1124-26; 14 Ga. L. Rev. 831, 840-41 (1980); 33
Vand. L. Rev. 1251, 1263-64 (1980).
223. See pt. I(B) supra; notes 102-113 supra and accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279, 285
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd sub nom. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215
(2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
225. It would be more appropriate for the legislature rather than the judiciary to
establish a finite period for survivability of publicity rights. See Maritote v. Desilu
Prods., Inc., 345 F.2d 418, 420 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. 382 U.S. 883 (1965); Lugosi
v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 847, 603 P.2d 425, 446, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323,
344 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting); Felcher & Rubin II, supra note 5, at 1131 n.27;
Descent of the Right of Publicity, supra note 5, at 774; 14 Ga. L. Rev. 831, 839 &
n.77, 842 (1980). If in the face of legislative inaction the judiciary were to assume the
task, it could look to the "public policy" embodied in comparable statutes. See, e.g.,
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 391-92 (1970). One commenta-
tor has observed that courts frequently look to statutes fbr guidance in interpreting
or modifying the common law. Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in Harvard
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period of survivability would adequately protect assignees who wish
to enter fixed-term agreements with the celebrity; such agreements
can be routinely renewed. Moreover, if it is not feasible to imple-
ment a mandatory licensing scheme or a judicial counterpart, a short
survivability period would recognize the important societal interests
in bringing the vast majority of historical personages to the public
domain within a reasonably brief period following their deaths.
Legal Essays 213, 226-28 (1934); see 14 Ga. L. Rev. 831, 839 n.77 tl9SOL Chief
Justice Bird in Lugosi observed that "[i]n fashioning common law rights and rem-
edies in the past, this court has often considered federal and state statutory schemes
for guidance." 25 Cal. 3d at 847, 603 P.2d at 446, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 344. see. e~g., In
re Estate of Mason, 62 Cal. 2d 213, 216-17, 397 P.2d 1005, 1008. 42 Cal. Rptr. 13,
16 (1965) (adoption of statutory rule governing abatement of testamentary gifts). In re
Waltreus, 62 Cal. 2d 218, 223-24, 397 P.2d 1001, 1004, 42 Cal. Rptr. 9, 12 196.5)
(adoption of federal criminal rule on production of prosecution witness' testimony .
Decorative Carpets, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 58 Cal. 2d 252, 255-56, 373
P.2d 637, 639, 23 Cal. Rptr. 589, 591 (1962) (use of tax statute governing reimburse-
ment of sales taxes intentionally computed on amounts not taxable in case enforcing
retailer's obligation to return taxes erroneously paid). This principle no doubt
accounts for the popularity with jurists and commentators of the 50 year post mortem
survival period under the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-810 11976 &
Supp. I 1977). See cases and commentaries cited note 222 supra. Nevertheless, if a
shorter period of survivability were deemed appropriate, as is herein urged, its
establishment would not be beyond judicial competence. Two state legislatures that
have considered the problem have set shorter periods. One such provision, for exam-
ple, is the Virginia statute granting an action for commercial misappropriation of a
deceased's name or image. Va. Code § 8.0140 B (1977). The action is specifically
limited to 20 years after the person's death. Id. The Florida statute provides a max-
imum period for enforcement of surviving publicity rights of 40 years. Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 540.08(4) (West 1972). If a descendible right of publicity is recognized as a matter
of common law, it would appear reasonable that courts could also appropriately limit
the duration of the newly recognized right.
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